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ABSTRACT
Barack Obama's successful run for President of the United States ex-
posed many intriguing sociological and political issues in American soci-
ety, not least of which was the question of race. Obama was the offspring
of a mother of White European ancestry and a father of African ancestry.
Obama is considered "Black," though some would argue he could have
been called "White" just as justifiably. The public discourse surrounding
the election of President Obama highlights the need for clarification. In
this Article, we explore the past to provide a foundational perspective. In
proposing a somewhat unconventional definition, we seek to contain
within the confines of its meaning the full essence of what it means to be
"Black" in present-day America, brought about by the historical socio-
political realities that spawned its existence. Thus, by electing a capacious
signifier, we show how the purposes of the contemporary regulatory
structure can best be benefitted. An expositional and graphical presenta-
tion places in illustrative and visual format the practical application of
what is proposed.
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 2008, Reverend Jesse Jackson was caught on tape making a
vulgar comment that used colorful language to express his displeasure
with then-presidential candidate Barack Obama.1 Jackson's comment
stemmed, in part, from an ongoing discussion about Obama's "Black-
1. Jesse Jackson Apologizes for Crude Obama Remarks, FOX NEWS, July 9, 2008,
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/elections/2008/07/09/jesse-jackson-apologizes-for-obama-
remarks/ (reporting Jackson's remark about Barack Obama during an interview with FOX
News). Jackson believed that his microphone was turned off at the time. Id. According to
FOX News:
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ness."2 Reverend Jackson's uncertainty about Obama's racial commit-
ments-he accused Obama of "talking down to [B]lack people" 3-was
part of a discourse of accusations in the public media (not to mention in
Black barbershops) that perhaps Obama was not "[B]lack enough."4 The
question this evokes (and the title of this Article) has less to do with
Obama's racial commitments and more to do with how we understand
the concept of race and racial categories in this country. It seems to us
that if race is indeed "constructed," then specifying who is and who is not
"Black" should depend on an understanding of race as a capacious signi-
fier that derives its meaning from cultural, political, and social factors-
not merely from the fact of one's skin color.
Barack Obama has repeatedly confirmed his status as a Black man,
having proclaimed himself the first African-American president of the
Harvard Law Review and referring to himself as only the third African-
American since Reconstruction to serve in the United States Senate.5
Throughout much of his adult life, he attended what he describes as a
"Black" church.6 Though Obama's view of his race is clear, the views of
the public seem decidedly diverse. For example, Ebony, one of the oldest
and most successful African-American magazines, described President
Jackson was speaking to a fellow guest at the time about Obama's speeches in [B]lack
churches and his support for faith-based charities. Jackson added before going live, "I
want to cut [Obama's] nuts off."
His microphone picked up the remarks.
Id. Rev. Jackson apologized for his inappropriate comment at a news conference later that
night. Id.
2. Id. In a written statement, Jackson said that he was trying to highlight the need for
Obama to discuss not only the obligations of Black males, but also to address larger issues
of "moral responsibility of government and the public policy for problems in the Black
community." Id. Obama's campaign stated that he would continue to speak out on those
broader issues of responsibility and that he accepted Jackson's apology. Id.
3. Id. Reverend Jackson explained that his comments about Obama were part of a
larger dialogue regarding "urban disparities." Id. As a counterpoint, President Obama's
then-spokesperson explained that Obama made a concerted effort during his campaign to
speak at length regarding parental responsibility. Id. In particular, Obama opined on the
importance of Black fathers being active in their children's lives. Id.
4. See Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, Is Obama Black Enough?, TIME, Feb. 1, 2007, available
at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1584736,00.html (criticizing pundits who
argued that Obama had less support from Black voters because he was considered a "good
[B]lack" as opposed to a "bad [B]lack"). Coates argues that Obama settled the debate
over his ethnicity long ago, when he explained that when he goes outside to hail a cab the
drivers were not likely to say, "Oh, there's a mixed race guy," as he is immediately identi-
fied as Black. Id.
5. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM My FATHER, at vii, ix (rev. ed. 2004).
6. Senator Barack Obama, Sen. Obama Delivers Remarks on Race Issues in Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania (Mar. 18, 2008) (transcript available at 2008 WL 716506) (discussing in
detail then-Senator Obama's experience at Trinity United Church of Christ).
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Obama as a model of "[B]lack cool," placing him on its August 2008
cover featuring "The 25 Coolest Brothers of All Time."'7 In 2008, Barack
Obama became the first African-American president of the United
States.8
This view of Obama is but one side of America's position on Obama's
race. Many have decried the proclamation of the United States' forty-
fourth President as "Black" or "African-American," and refuse to accept
him as such.9 Among those who refuse to accept Barack Obama as the
first "Black" President of the United States, there is disagreement as to
why he is not. Some have rejected Obama's Blackness outright, declaring
him multi-racial and not African-American.' ° In 2008, Endy M. Bayuni
of the Jakarta Post boldly asserted, "I don't mean to spoil the party, but
here is the bad news for African-Americans: Obama is not [B]lack."' 1
Members of a biracial support group called Swirl expressed support for
Obama's choice to identify as Black, but recognized the importance of his
acknowledgement of his White ancestry as well.12 A contributor to the
7. William Jelani Cobb, The Genius of Cool; The 25 Coolest Brothers of All Time,
EBONY, Aug. 2008, at 68. Obama is, Ebony states, a model of "[B]lack cool" because of his
quick-witted nature, truthful candor, concise articulation, and integrity. Id.
8. Alex Johnson, Obama Elected 44th President, MSNBC, Nov. 5, 2008, http://
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/27531033. The percentage of American voters who participated in
this historic election was higher than it had been in "at least a generation and perhaps since
1908." Id. Obama won decisively among African-American voters, received a strong
showing from female and Latino voters, and won by a margin of two to one among voters
aged thirty and younger. Id. Election experts said almost 140 million Americans partici-
pated in the election and many "minority, immigrant and younger Americans" were voting
for the first time. Id.
9. See, e.g., Endy M. Bayuni, Op-Ed., Is Obama Black or White?, JAKARTA POST,
Nov. 7, 2008, at 6, available at 2008 WLNR 21262287 (claiming that President Obama is
not, in fact, Black).
10. See, e.g., id. (challenging the use of the word "Black" to describe Obama due to
his mixed race and his childhood spent as a member of a White family).
11. Id. (decrying the practice of calling Obama Black as an obstacle to transcending
racial stereotypes). Bayuni argues that calling President Obama the first Black president
unnecessarily perpetuates racial divisions. Id. In fact, Bayuni believes that calling Obama
Black is "a sad reminder that racism is still embedded in [Americans'] mentality." Id. The
author argues that when a person who is the child of mixed-race parents is "treated as a
Negro," there exists racial prejudice stemming from a concept of racial hierarchy. Id.
12. Jason Carroll, Behind the Scenes: Is Barack Obama Black or Biracial?, CNN, June
9, 2008, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/06/09/btsc.obama.race/ (acknowledging the
struggle that multi-racial persons face in defining their own race and their identification
with Barack Obama's predicament in defining his). More than six million Americans iden-
tified themselves as "multiracial" in the 2000 Census-the first census in which Americans
had the opportunity to identify as such. Id. Obama's mixed ethnicity includes him in this
category. Id. One member of Swirl explained that the "debate over Obama's racial iden-
tity is very familiar" and that she has "been dealing with this issue her whole life." Id.
Carroll argues that labeling Obama Black disregards "a vital and legitimate side of his
[Vol. 12:213
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Washington Post stated, "Unless the one-drop rule still applies, our Presi-
dent-elect is not [B]lack. We call him that-he calls himself that-be-
cause we use dated language and logic."13 Short of conducting an
extensive survey, which is well outside the scope of this Article, one could
never know the true, overall sentiment of the public about Barack
Obama's race and the "one-drop rule." But there appears to be more
ambivalence among Americans about Obama's race than his simple
description of himself as African-American would lead one to believe.
In this Article, we strive to develop a universally acceptable definition
of a concept that some find antiquated-race-and seek to discourage re-
postulating the existence of race and axiomatically identifying distinct ra-
cial groupings. Modern-day anthropologists scoff at the notion that one
can "biologize" race by attempting to apply a valid scientific genetic con-
struct to diverse groupings of people with little genetic commonality, 4
and we do not necessarily disagree. What this Article proffers is that, for
better or worse, race remains an important concept in this country to-
day.15 We explore, as many others have done, the historical socio-politi-
life." Id. The author discusses the view of Obama as a "post-racial" candidate, one who
transcends labels and appeals not only to Black and White citizens, but to all races. Id.; see
also DAVID MENDELL, OBAMA: FROM PROMISE TO POWER 6 (2007). Mendell explains:
[Obama] is not of the same specific ancestry as most [B]lacks in the United States, nor
has he lived the typical [B]lack experience in America. Yet he is accepted by most as a
brother, in large part because his physical appearance is decidedly African and his
wife and children are [African-American]. He was raised by a [W]hite family and
educated in elite [W]hite institutions, giving him nonthreatening appeal and instant
credibility with the [W]hite cognoscenti.
DAVID MENDELL, OBAMA: FROM PROMISE TO POWER 6 (2007).
13. Marie Arana, Op-Ed., He's Not Black, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2008, at B01, availa-
ble at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/28/AR200811280221
9.html. "After more than [three hundred] years and much difficult history, we hew to the
old racist rule: Part-[B]lack is all [B]lack. Fifty percent equals a hundred. There's no in-
between." Id. Explaining that skin color is "an unreliable marker," the author believes
that racial labels "validate the separation of races." Id.
14. See AM. ANTHROPOLOGICAL Assoc., STATEMENT ON "RACE" (1998), http://
www.understandingrace.org/about/statement.html (asserting that race is actually based on
ideology and culture more than biological or physiological differences). The American
Anthropological Association (AAA) claims that race means more than physical differ-
ences. Id. In fact, the overwhelming majority of physical variation lies within racial
groups. Id. Accordingly, "any attempt to establish lines of division among biological
populations [is] both arbitrary and subjective." Id.
15. Were it not so, would it be a news story fit for publication in a recent Washington
Post article that Disney has just created its first ever Black Disney princess? See Neely
Tucker, A Fairy Tale Beginning, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2009, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/16/AR2009041603139.html (re-
porting that Tiana, the princess featured in Disney's newest movie, The Princess and the
Frog, symbolizes a major step towards positive perception of African-Americans because
of Disney's "pervasive influence" in American culture). The Post states: "The implied
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cal context for the development of this phenomenon known as race, with
our attentions strictly focused upon what is currently termed the "Black"
or "African-American" race.' 6 Scholars have proposed solutions to cate-
gorically accommodate the reality of the ever-increasing numbers of
mixed-race peoples,17 and others essentially argue for the abolition of ra-
cial categories altogether. 8 We do not join in either approach other than
to propose a definition of race that embodies the socio-political realities
that generate its meaning.
Defining race may be useful in a regulatory context for the myriad of
state and federal laws in which race is categorized and may also be used
as a guidepost for the judiciary when faced with this issue. In proffering a
definition of what it is to be "Black," we do imply that there is a need for
continued categorization for the benefit of those who may be in need of
the protections race affords. But we do not support continued categori-
zation in order to minimize the desire for more precise "identification" by
those who would prefer a multiracial choice-although admittedly a cor-
rolary. Certainly, to be deemed "Colored" or "Negro" in the history of
this country could result in severe penalties, from being held in bondage,
imprisoned, denied basic rights, or even killed. Our country has rid itself
of many vestiges of racial persecution, with anti-miscegenation laws hav-
ing been the most tenacious holdouts. 9 What exist in this country today
message of Tiana, that [B]lack American girls can be as elegant as Snow White herself, is a
milestone in the national imagery, according to a range of scholars and cultural historians."
Id.
16. The terms "African-American," "Black," "Negro," and "Colored" may be used
more or less interchangeably throughout this Article, as these terms (and negative conno-
tative derivations thereof, which merit no mention) have been variously used throughout
history.
17. E.g., Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 2-3 (1991) (arguing that the continued application of "color-blind constitutional-
ism" encourages White racial domination); Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One
Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV.
1161, 1203-05 (1997) (calling for a rejection of the "one drop rule" of race in the United
States Census by embracing a multiracial category). Though the United States Census did
implement a policy in which people of mixed race could check multiple boxes on the 2000
Census, there does not exist a separate "multiracial" category. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S.
CENSUS 2000 FORM D-2, http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/pdfld02p.pdf.
18. E.g., Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1093, 1093-94 (2004) (arguing that the concept of race "perpetuates prejudices and
misconceptions," justifies the unequal treatment of people, and leads to violence). Race,
Hoffman proclaims, is a false concept. Id. at 1098. Hoffman argues that ethnic and cul-
tural identities, "central to many people's understanding of themselves," should replace
the term "race" in future statutes. Id. at 1100.
19. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1175-79 (1997) (noting
[Vol. 12:213
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are laws that are designed to protect and benefit African-Americans, re-
flecting a shift in focus from legal penalties to legal benefits.
We examine these laws to note the modern-day efforts to define who is
Black or African-American. Our explorations into the past are done to
ensure that any modern-day construction of Blackness accommodates the
realities of the historical context and to clarify the origins of readers' pre-
existing concepts of Blackness.
In sum, our task is threefold: 1) to explore the history of the Black race
in America in its defining moments; 2) to review existing relevant laws
and jurisprudence with its presuppositions that there is a group of people
who are known in our present culture as Black or African-American; and
3) to propose a basis for defining who is "Black" or "African-American."
II. THE HISTORICAL SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT
A. In the Beginning, There Was Slavery
With one short, yet profound sentence, a Virginia court stated in 1656
that a "Mulatto [is] held to be a slave."'20 That sentence is the entirety of
the court's opinion, and no more is known about the facts of that case.21
However, the court made it clear that a significant amount of so-called
"White blood" was not enough to protect a person's freedom if he or she
had any "Black blood" at all.22 This model of Black-White socio-legal
interaction has produced angst and dread in the African-American com-
munity for over 350 years. 23 Although the notion of race itself has often
the various laws in place since the founding of the colonies regarding interracial birth and
marriage).
20. Id. at 1174 (footnote omitted). "The legal treatment of Mulattoes as Blacks, with
all of the attached legal disabilities, may have begun as early as the seventeenth century."
Id.
21. Id. ("Although the opinion consists of a single sentence, and we know of no sup-
porting record to illuminate the facts of the case, its logic constructs the American view of
racial mixture between Black and White that has endured for over three hundred years.").
22. Id. at 1174-75.
23. See id. at 1174-87 (explaining the historical impact of this case on laws and prac-
tices concerning Mulattoes and African-Americans in the United States). As Hickman
explains:
The rule of [defining mixed-race persons by the race that is considered inferior] thus
had its origins with the arrival of European and African people on this continent.
During the ensuing three hundred years, [this rule] drew broad boundaries around the
African-American race, including within these boundaries the offspring of Europeans
and Native Americans, and it bound this race firmly together as a people.
Id. at 1187.
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been debated and disputed,24 the reality of race as a determinant of social
and political position has been with us since the first slaves set foot on
American soil. What was sociologically known as "hypodescent" and in-
formally known as the "one drop rule" required not only that anyone
with an African ancestor be deemed Black, but also, more insidiously,
any person who is part Black must be subject to the detriments of that
classification-i.e., inferiority and even slavery.25
The importance of the legal construct of race in early America cannot
be overstated-it often meant the difference between life and death.26
An 1831 Ohio case, Gray v. State, illuminates the difficulty courts encoun-
tered in determining an individual's race.27 In that case, the prosecution
called a Negro to testify as a witness against Ms. Gray, who was indicted
for robbery.28 The Negro witness placed Gray at the scene of the rob-
bery, though Ohio then had a statute that prohibited Blacks and Mulat-
toes from testifying against Whites.2 9 Because Ms. Gray was a very fair-
skinned woman who easily could have "passed" for White, an issue arose
as to whether Ms. Gray was White or Mulatto.3° Ohio had no statute that
defined Mulatto, but the court did state that the definition of Mulatto was
well known.3' Gray claimed to be an octoroon, or of one-eighth African
blood.32 By observing the color of the defendant's skin alone, which was
closer to White than Mulatto, the court found that Ms. Gray was White.3 3
The court made this determination while admitting "the difficulty of de-
fining and ascertaining the degree of duskiness" needed to identify a per-
son's proper race.34 This approach left each defendant's fate in the hands
of the subjective whim of the judge, though the Ohio Supreme Court
later adopted the "more White blood than Black blood" rule, wherein
persons of mixed blood were successful in being classified as White if they
24. See, e.g., D. Marvin Jones, Darkness Made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial
Self, 82 GEO. L.J. 437, 439-40 (1993) (arguing that "race is not so much a category but a
practice: people are raced" (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)).
25. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (1997) (defining the
term "hypodescent" and how it has been used in American history as a tool to justify racial
inferiority).
26. See, e.g., Thurman v. State, 18 Ala. 276, 278 (1850) (considering the race of the
defendant, a multiracial man, as a central issue in determining whether or not he would
receive death if convicted of raping a White woman).
27. 4 Ohio 353, 353 (1831).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 354.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Gray, 4 Ohio at 353.
33. Id. at 354.
34. Id.
[Vol. 12:213
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could prove that they had more White than Black blood. A person who
was fifty percent Black and fifty percent White would be considered
Black.36
Thurman v. State, an 1850 Alabama Supreme Court case, further dem-
onstrates the complexity of circumscribing a person's race.3 7 Thurman
was an individual of dubious racial composition, who was accused of rap-
ing a White woman.38 Alabama then had in effect a statute that stated,
"Every slave, free [N]egro, or Mulatto, who shall commit, or attempt to
commit the crime of rape on a [W]hite woman, and be thereof convicted,
shall suffer death," but the state had no statute that defined "Mulatto. '39
The prosecution accused Thurman of being a Mulatto, essentially defin-
ing Mulatto as any person with White and Negro blood.4 ° The court de-
termined that the word "Mulatto" had a specific and defined meaning:
that is, the offspring of the union of a Negro and a White. Although
Thurman had "kinky hair and yellow skin," the court would not acknowl-
edge such evidence as sufficient to sort out the ambiguity of Thurman's
racial mixture.41 In reversing Thurman's conviction, the court concluded
that it was the purview of the legislature to tighten the definition of Mu-
latto.4" The Alabama legislature quickly took the court's advice and, in
1852, passed a law that defined Mulatto as anyone having one-eighth or
more African blood.43
The freedom of Gray and the life of Thurman hinged upon the nebu-
lous definition of race.44 There was no valid objective standard for deter-
mining race; it only mattered what a particular court decided in any
particular case. Gray and Thurman fared well, but in many other cases,
the opposite occurred.45 The concept that one drop of "Black blood"
35. Anderson v. Millikin, 9 Ohio St. 568, 572 (1859) (stating that persons with more
than one-half "White blood" would be considered "White").
36. Id.
37. 18 Ala. 276, 278 (1850).
38. Id. at 277-78.
39. Id. at 278-80.
40. Id. at 277.
41. Id. at 278.
42. Thurman, 18 Ala. at 279.
43. Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Vir-
ginia, 1860s-1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 374 (1994).
44. Thurman, 18 Ala. at 278; Gray v. State, 4 Ohio 353, 353 (1831).
45. See, e.g., Daniel v. Guy, 19 Ark. 121, 134 (1857) (finding that if a person appeared
to be Black, there was a rebuttable presumption that he was a slave); see also Christine B.
Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, African Americans, and the
U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1225-31 (1997) (analyzing the historical and practical
realities of courts using fractional statutes, or those that define racial identity by fractional
ancestry, to determine the race of mixed-race individuals). When the task of proving one's
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made one "Black" and, ipso facto, inferior, underpinned the rationale for
slavery, segregation, and later, both explicit and implicit discrimination.46
B. The Legal Construction of Race in the Reconstruction47 and Jim
Crow 48 Eras
Although President Abraham Lincoln was opposed to slavery, he en-
tered his presidency willing to settle for keeping slavery from expanding
to the territories; the Southern states, however, would not be appeased.49
On September 22, 1862, in order to punish and destabilize states that
were rising against the Union, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Procla-
mation, which declared that slaves in certain states and parts of states that
were in rebellion against the Union would be freed on January 1, 1863.50
At that time, Blacks comprised a majority of the populations of Louisi-
ana, Mississippi, and South Carolina; over forty percent of the popula-
tions of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Virginia; and more than thirty-
three percent of the population of North Carolina, a fact of political sig-
nificance. 51 After the passage of the Civil War amendments, Blacks were
poised to enjoy freedom, citizenship, and political power. When Con-
gress required the former Confederate states to form new governments
and hold political conventions, the stage was set for Blacks to exercise
these newfound liberties.52 White Republicans, both Northerners (some-
race was not an issue, however, the fractional statutes were strictly applied, and those
deemed non-White were frequently denied substantial rights. Id. at 1228.
46. Wendell L. Griffen, Race, Law and Culture: A Call to New Thinking, Leadership,
and Action, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 901, 913-17 (1999).
47. Reconstruction lasted from the end of the Civil War in 1865 until the removal of
Northern federal troops from the South in 1877. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at xxv (2002).
48. The Jim Crow era lasted from the time of the removal of Northern federal troops
from the South in 1877 until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 586.
49. Kevin D. Brown & Vinay Sitapi, Lessons Learned from Comparing the Applica-
tion of Constitutional Law and Federal Anti-Discrimination Law to African-Americans in
the U.S. and Dalits in India in the Context of Higher Education, 24 HARV. BLACKLE-r'ER
L.J. 3, 10-11 (2008).
50. Abraham Lincoln, Emancipation Proclamation (Sept. 22, 1862) (transcript availa-
ble at http://ritter.tea.state.tx.us/ssc/primaryresources/pdf/Emancipation-Proclamation.
pdf).
51. Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 80-81 (2008).
52. See W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical,
and Related Considerations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 43 (2004) ("The entire post-Civil War legisla-
tive agenda, which consisted of the passage of civil rights statutes and proposed constitu-
tional amendments, was the result of a massive change in the political landscape
accompanying the victory by the North over the South.").
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times called "carpetbaggers") 5 3 and Southerners (often known as "scala-
wags"),54 were a powerful force in the South.55 With Blacks gaining the
right to vote and at least seventy percent of Black voters turning out for
elections, Blacks became formidable Republican allies.56 The coalition of
White and Black Republicans took control of congressional delegations,
state legislatures, and county and city governments in the South.57
Life appeared hopeful for Blacks in the Southern states, but the Demo-
cratic Whites struck back.58 First, federal troops sent to oversee Recon-
struction at the end of the Civil War pulled out of the Southern states in
1877."9 Democratic Whites regained control of the Southern states using
both physical intimidation (murders, lynching, and beatings) and political
intimidation (poll taxes and outright election fraud).6" As a result, by
1880 all Southern states were again Democratic.61
53. A carpetbagger was "a Northern officeholder in the South during the period of
[R]econstruction after the Civil War who took advantage of the unsettled conditions."
WEBSTER'S DELUXE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 276 (2d ed. 1983). Used contemptuously,
the term "referr[ed] to the fact that such men usually carried all their belongings in a single
carpetbag." Id.
54. A scalawag was "a [W]hite Southerner who was a Republican during the Recon-
struction following the Civil War." Id. at 1614. The term was used disparagingly by South-
ern Democrats. Id.
55. W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical, and
Related Considerations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 43 (2004).
56. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877, at 314 (1988). While Blacks voted in massive numbers, Southern White voters
were apathetic or hoped that, by refraining from voting, they would prevent the success of
attempts to amend the Constitution to better protect racial minorities. Id. Through the
support of African-Americans, White Republican candidates thrived. Gabriel J. Chin &
Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Diffi-
culty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 82 (2008).
57. Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 82-83 (2008).
58. Id. at 87-90 (describing the brutal tactics used by White Southerners to retake
political power from Blacks).
59. W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical, and
Related Considerations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 47 (2004). As a result, "[t]he South almost imme-
diately began a vicious process of suppressing the social and civil rights of the [B]lack
population . I..." Id. (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 74-75. "Between 1878 and 1898, [W]hites lynched approximately 10,000
persons, most of whom were [B]lack. Additionally, during this era, states systematically
disenfranchised [BIlacks through violence, massacres, and a variety of legal devices such as
literacy tests, property tests, poll taxes, understanding clauses, and grandfather clauses."
Id. at 74 (footnotes omitted).
61. Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the Minority: Jim Crow and the
Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 65, 83-85, 90 (2008).
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1. The Slaughter-House Cases and Cruikshank
United States Supreme Court decisions that defined the power rela-
tionship between the federal and state governments also caused the gains
Blacks made in the South to wane. The most significant of these deci-
sions were the Slaughter-House Cases6 2  and United States v.
Cruikshank.63
The Slaughter-House Cases was a "watershed" decision.64 It defined
the post-Civil War power relationship between the federal and state gov-
ernments in favor of the states.65 Even though the case arose in a race-
neutral context, it impacted the race question by placing the basic civil
rights of Blacks in the hands of the individual states.6 6 Thus, the White
political apparatuses of the individual states were enabled to both define
and curtail the civil rights of Blacks.67
The Slaughter-House Cases arose when Louisiana attempted to incor-
porate the major slaughterhouses of New Orleans. 68  Local butchers,
forced to slaughter their own livestock at the state-owned slaughterhouse,
alleged that this statute violated the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the federal Constitution by creating "an involuntary servitude,"
by abridging "the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
62. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
63. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
64. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Chase Court and Fundamental Rights: A Watershed in
American Constitutionalism, 21 N. Ky. L. REV. 151, 151 (1993) (arguing that the Slaughter-
House Cases represented the Supreme Court's rejection of federal civil rights laws). The
Court abolished the political idea that the Department of Justice would enforce the "rights
of Americans in the South during Reconstruction." Id.
65. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 43 (holding that the rights guaranteed by
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments only applied to federal, but not state,
citizenship).
66. See id. The Slaughter-House Cases emerged from a contentious piece of Louisiana
legislation that incorporated the major slaughterhouses of New Orleans in order for the
city to exert tighter regulatory control over the disposal of carcasses. Id. at 83 (Field, J.,
dissenting). The owners of the affected slaughterhouses contended that the act denied
them equal protection as lawful business owners. Id. at 86. The Court concluded that the
newly adopted Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause did not create
a cause of action for state citizens who were denied equal protection rights by the states.
Id. at 43 (majority opinion). Thus, as Justice Field explained in his dissenting opinion,
The question presented is, therefore, one of the gravest importance, not merely to
the parties here, but to the whole country. It is nothing less than the question whether
the recent amendments to the [f]ederal Constitution protect the citizens of the United
States against the deprivation of their common rights by [s]tate legislation.
Id. at 89 (Field, J., dissenting).
67. See id. at 43 (declining to apply the protections of the Civil War amendments to a
denial of state citizens' equal protection rights).
68. Id. at 59-60.
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States," by denying them "equal protection of the laws," and by depriving
"them of their property without due process of law."69
While the factual basis of the Slaughter-House Cases had nothing di-
rectly to do with the civil rights of Blacks, the Court's conclusion in these
consolidated cases substantially impacted the evolution of Blacks' civil
rights.7" In a battle of states rights versus federal rights, this case decided
who would govern the individual civil rights of a state's citizens-the
state governments or the federal government.71 Clearly recognizing that
its decision would have monumental implications for the outcome of that
battle, the Court stated:
We do not conceal from ourselves the great responsibility which
this duty devolves upon us. No questions so far-reaching and per-
vading in their consequences, so profoundly interesting to the people
of this country, and so important in their bearings upon the relations
of the United States, and the several [s]tates to each other and to the
citizens of the [s]tates and of the United States, have been before this
court during the official life of any of its present members.72
The Court's decision ultimately put the states firmly in control of their
own citizens' civil rights.73
For Black people, perhaps the most compelling aspect of the Court's
analysis was its construction of the Fourteenth Amendment, which states
that citizens by birth or naturalization "are citizens of the United States
and of the [s]tate wherein they reside."74 The Court held that a person is
a citizen of the United States and separately a citizen of the state in which
69. Id. at 66.
70. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 89 (Field, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Court's decision limiting the scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments to pre-
clude application to state citizens would have far-reaching consequences for all locally dis-
enfranchised Americans); see also Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Chase Court and
Fundamental Rights: A Watershed in American Constitutionalism, 21 N. Ky. L. REV. 151,
151 (1993) (discussing the practical import of the Slaughter-House Cases for Black Ameri-
cans after the Civil War). The author asserts:
Politically, [the Slaughter-House Cases] abolished the constitutional theory on which
the Justice Department depended in its enforcement of the fundamental rights of
Americans in the South during Reconstruction. The Court thus provided legal sanc-
tion for the Grant administration's retreat in 1873 from its civil rights enforcement
efforts. The Court's decision annulled a revolution in American constitutionalism.
Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Chase Court and Fundamental Rights: A Watershed in Ameri-
can Constitutionalism, 21 N. Ky. L. REV. 151, 151 (1993).
71. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 67 ("This Court is thus called upon for the
first time to give construction to [the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments].").
72. Id.
73. Id. at 83.
74. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
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he or she resides. 75 Further, state citizenship gives a person rights and
responsibilities distinct from those derived from United States citizen-
ship.76 The dichotomy between United States citizenship and state citi-
zenship is the heart of the matter in the Slaughter-House Cases, as it
determines whether the federal government has the power to regulate the
civil rights of state citizens. 7 The dilemma for Blacks was that, under the
Slaughter-House Cases rule, the states could effectively define and admin-
ister state citizens' civil rights.78 Moreover, the states were empowered to
prohibit the federal government from interfering with state administra-
tion of civil rights law as applied to state citizens.79 It was, thus, up to the
states to determine the civil rights of state citizens.8"
75. Id. at 74.
76. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 74.
77. Id. To clarify the dichotomy between United States citizenship and citizenship of
a particular state, the Court quoted the definition of "privileges and immunities" from
Corfield v. Coryell:
The inquiry . . . is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several
[s]tates? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free
governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several
[s]tates which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent,
and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than
difficult to enumerate. They may all, however, be comprehended under the following
general heads: protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, never-
theless, to such restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good of the
whole.
Id. at 76 (quoting 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)). Thus, the Court
found that the states have the power to limit or expand those fundamental rights, so long
as the limitation or expansion also applies to the citizens of other states within their juris-
dictions. Id. at 77.
78. Id. at 74.
79. Id. at 79-83.
80. Id. at 82. Since the Slaughter-House Cases were brought under the federal Consti-
tution, the question became whether the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects a fed-
eral citizen from discrimination under state law. Id. The Court answered that it does not,
stating:
Under the pressure of all the excited feeling growing out of the [Civil War], our
statemen have still believed that the existence of the [s]tate with powers for domestic
and local government, including the regulation of civil rights-the rights of person and
of property-was essential to the perfect working of our complex form of government
Id. (emphasis added). With this statement, the Court effectively limited the administration
and policing of individual civil rights activities to the state and local governments and de-
clared that these individual civil rights activities logically and historically belonged to the
state and local governments. See id.
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If the dual nature of citizenship espoused in the Slaughter-House Cases
was not prominently obvious, it became demonstrably unambiguous in
United States v. Cruikshank, decided in 1876.81 This case completely gut-
ted the Enforcement Act of 187082 and the Civil Rights (Ku Klux Klan)
Act of 1871,83 both of which were enacted to give substance to the rights
of Blacks under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.84
In what has been called the bloodiest riot in Reconstruction history,
over one hundred Blacks were murdered by a mob of Whites in Colfax,
Louisiana in 1872.85 Nine White members of this mob were charged, pur-
suant to the Enforcement Act of 1870, with attempting to prevent or hin-
der the Black victims from voting.86 Three of the nine defendants were
convicted of intimidation and murder.87
From these convictions and appeal, we get Cruikshank.88 The appeal
of the three convicted defendants was based upon the argument that the
charges in the indictment should have been brought under state law, as
any rights that may have been violated were state, not federal, rights.89
In Cruikshank, the U.S. Supreme Court reinforced the concept of dual
citizenship described in the Slaughter-House Cases.90
The Court proceeded to show how the very rights guaranteed by the
Constitution-the right to peaceably assemble, the right to bear arms, the
right to due process of law, the right to equal protection of the law, the
81. See 92 U.S. 542, 551 (1875) (declining to incorporate the Bill of Rights to the
states).
82. ch. 114, 116 Stat. 140 (1870) (requiring equal freedoms and equal punishments for
Whites and Blacks).
83. ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)) (provid-
ing a civil remedy to Blacks terrorized by the Ku Klux Klan in the years following passage
of the Civil War amendments). The act states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
of any [sitate ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id.
84. See Francisco M. Ugarte, Reconstruction Redux: Rehnquist, Morrison, and the
Civil Rights Cases, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481, 483 (2006) (arguing that Supreme
Court decisions during this era repealed anti-discrimination legislation and effectively en-
ded Reconstruction in the South).
85. James Filkins, Note, Tarpley v. Keistler: Patronage, Petition, and the Noerr-Pen-
nington Doctrine, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 265, 280 n.131 (2000).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 559 (1875) (overturning the
convictions).
89. Id. at 548-49.
90. Id. at 550.
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right to vote in a state election, and the right not to be intimidated for
voting in a state election-were state rights in which the federal govern-
ment had no authority to interfere so long as any abridgment of those
rights was committed by individuals acting in an individual capacity. 91
The Court stated that the federal government may intervene to enforce
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in the states only when the
states or their agents either directly or indirectly violate a U.S. citizen's
rights under those amendments.92 But such facts were not present in
Cruikshank, which involved only individual, rather than state, conduct.
93
For Blacks, Cruikshank was the baby birthed from the holding and ratio-
nale of the Slaughter-House Cases. The impact upon Blacks94 was to strip
them of vital federal civil rights and protections approximately one year
prior to the departure of Northern federal troops from the South. 95 The
political, social, and economic writing was on the wall for Blacks, not only
in the South, but in all of America.
2. Pace v. Alabama
One of the first post-Reconstruction cases involving state efforts to cur-
tail the citizenship rights of Blacks was Pace v. Alabama, an 1883 case in
which an African-American man and his wife, a White woman, were
charged under a statute that prohibited Negro and White persons from
cohabiting, whether or not they were married. 96 Both Pace and his wife
were convicted under this statute, and each was sentenced to two years in
the penitentiary.97 Because a cohabitating but unmarried couple of the
same race would face only a small fine and up to six months in the county
jail, Pace alleged a violation of his equal protection rights.98 But the
Court held that there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
91. Id. at 551-57.
92. Id. at 549-51.
93. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. at 548.
94. While this Article concerns African-Americans, the Cruikshank holding affected
the rights of all minorities.
95. Dewey M. Clayton, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Voting Precinct: A
Brief History of Disenfranchisement in America, 34 BLACK SCHOLAR, Sept. 2004, at 43.
96. 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883), overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
97. Pace v. Alabama, 69 Ala. 231, 231 (1881), affd, 106 U.S. 583 (1883), overruled by
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964). The Supreme Court of Alabama found no
important distinction between the use of the phrases "live in adultery" or "fornication with
each other." Id. Instead, the court found the defendants' races, combined with the type of
offense, to be determinative in establishing the punishment. Id.
98. Id.
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because both Pace and his wife were convicted of the same crime and
sentenced to the same amount of time.99
Not only did the Court choose to ignore the validity of Pace's equal
protection argument, but, more derisively, it also overlooked the Ala-
bama Supreme Court's virulently racist explanation for upholding this
blatantly discriminatory law:
The evil tendency of the crime of living in adultery or fornication is
greater when it is committed between persons of the two races, than
between persons of the same race. Its result may be the amalgama-
tion of the two races, producing a mongrel population and a de-
graded civilization, the prevention of which is dictated by a sound
public policy affecting the highest interests of society and
government.100
As a result of this decision, the state courts were now free to blatantly
deny equal protection to Blacks. 1
3. Anti-Miscegenation Laws
Miscegenation, the antiquated term meaning mixing of the races, 0 2 be-
gan shortly after Africans landed on the North American shores.1 0 3
Records show that while mingling and mixing of the races was officially
frowned upon, it was also widely practiced in the New World." The
prevention of the commingling of the races was a way of protecting not
only the White psyche, but also the property and privilege upon which
the underpinnings of the White socio-political machine depended.10 5 Af-
ter the South lost the Civil War, the emancipation of Blacks-and the
99. Pace, 106 U.S. at 585 ("Whatever discrimination is made in the punishment pre-
scribed in the two sections is directed against the offense designated and not against the
person of any particular color or race.").
100. Pace, 69 Ala. at 231.
101. It is sad to note that this case was not questioned until 1964, when it was finally
overruled by McLaughlin v. Florida. See 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) ("Pace represents a
limited view of the Equal Protection Clause, which has not withstood analysis in the subse-
quent decisions of this Court.").
102. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1019 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "miscegenation" as
"[a] marriage between persons of different races, formerly considered illegal in some
jurisdictions").
103. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, Afri-
can Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1171 (1997).
104. Id.
105. See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1720-21
(1993) ("[Tlhe line between [W]hite and Black was extremely critical; it became a line of
protection and demarcation from the potential threat of commodification, and it deter-
mined the allocation of the benefits and burdens of this form of property.").
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ascension of Blacks to political power-threatened the social, political,
and financial dominance of Whites, particularly in the South.10 6
The U.S. Supreme Court would become an important player in the pro-
tection and preservation of the White way of life through its holding in
the Slaughter-House Cases, which effectively empowered the states to
deny their own citizens' civil rights through the enforcement of anti-mis-
cegenation laws.'1 7 For example, a Black man and a White woman who
had lived together for a considerable time with their three sons in Vir-
ginia were eventually married in Washington, D.C. in 1874.08 Virginia's
supreme court of appeals held that, although the marriage was valid in
the District of Columbia, the contract was void as against the public pol-
icy of upholding moral purity in Virginia. 109
In Green v. State, the Alabama Supreme Court employed the reasoning
of the Slaughter-House Cases in surmising that marriage, interracial or
otherwise, is a state civil right.10 The court deemed the Fourteenth
Amendment, which deals exclusively with federal civil rights, not applica-
ble to Alabama's anti-miscegenation law, which the court upheld."'
Thus, implicitly or explicitly, the handprint of the Slaughter-House Cases
was visible upon the jurisprudence of state anti-miscegenation cases.
4. Plessy v. Ferguson
Plessy v. Ferguson spawned the virulent doctrine of "separate but
equal."'1 2 It was a principle that would hold sway in American jurispru-
dence and life for fifty-eight years until overturned in 1954 by Brown v.
Board of Education."3
The Plessy Court held that Blacks and Whites may be legally segre-
gated on public transportation. 114 Though Plessy claimed to be only one-
eighth Black, he was lawfully charged with violation of the segregation
statute.1 15 But Plessy did not add anything to the determination of who is
106. Julie Novkov, Racial Constructions: The Legal Regulation of Miscegenation in
Alabama, 1980-1934, 20 LAw & HIST. REv. 225, 228-29 (2002).
107. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 67 (1872) (granting the states the power
to define the civil rights of state citizens).
108. Kinney v. Virginia, 1878 WL 5945, at *1-2 (Va. Oct. 3, 1878).
109. Id. at *7.
110. Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 195 (1877).
111. Id.
112. See 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (using the phrase "separate
but equal" to describe the impact of the majority's decision), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
113. 347 U.S. 483, 495-96 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine of "separate but equal" in the
field of public education).
114. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 538.
115. Id. at 528.
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Black and, in fact, left the question of Plessy's race for another day and
another court.1 16 What Plessy did do was separate political and social
equality, determining that the law afforded Blacks only political equal-
ity. 117 The court explained:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts, or to abolish dis-
tinctions based upon physical differences, and the attempt to do so
can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the present situa-
tion. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal, one can-
not be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be
inferior to the other socially, the [C]onstitution of the United States
cannot put them upon the same plane.1 1
If Plessy was simply about public accommodations, it would not have
had such an impact. 1 9 But the ratification of the "separate but equal"
doctrine was critical in myriad contexts. For example, after Plessy, sepa-
rate school systems and public facilities were sanctioned so long as they
could be made "separate but equal."1' 0 Further, we find that the "but
equal" part of the mandate quickly became nonexistent. In 1899, a little
over three years after Plessy, the same U.S. Supreme Court held that it
was not unequal treatment of Blacks for White high school students in a
separate school to receive a free high school education while, at same
116. Id. at 551-52.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 551-52.
119. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate aggressions,
more or less brutal and irritating, upon the admitted rights of [Clolored citizens, but
will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the
beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in view when they
adopted the recent amendments of the [Clonstitution, by one of which the [B]lacks of
this country were made citizens of the United States and of the states in which they
respectively reside, and whose privileges and immunities, as citizens, the states are
forbidden to abridge. Sixty millions of [W]hites are in no danger from the presence
here of eight millions of [B]lacks. The destinies of the two races, in this country, are
indissolubly linked together, and the interests of both require that the common gov-
ernment of all shall not permit the seeds of race hate to be planted under the sanction
of law. What can more certainly arouse race hate, what more certainly create and
perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these races, than state enactments which, in
fact, proceed on the ground that [C]olored citizens are so inferior and degraded that
they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by [W]hite citizens? That, as
all will admit, is the real meaning of such legislation as was enacted in Louisiana.
Id.
120. Gong Lum v. Rice, 375 U.S. 78, 87 (1927) (holding that it was not a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for Mississippi to mandate the
separation of schools for White and "Colored" children).
20101
THE SCHOLAR
time, Black high school students had to pay tuition.12' For Blacks, the
reality of separate and unequal belied what the Court regarded as its wis-
dom in establishing "separate but equal."
5. A New Dawning
In the fifty-eight-year period from 1896 to 1954, there were monumen-
tal changes in the socio-political climate in the United States. 22 There
was the birth of the NAACP, in which Whites united with Blacks in rec-
ognition of the plight of Blacks as second-class citizens and began a com-
bined effort to rectify this situation. 123 Social activists W. E. B. DuBois,
the first African-American to receive a Ph.D. from Harvard, and Marcus
Garvey, a publisher and journalist, instigated Blacks to take a fresh look
at their being and value. 124 There was the Harlem Renaissance, in which
young Black artists expressed themselves in their Blackness. 125 Two
world wars in which Blacks made major military contributions were
fought. 126 And on the sports scene, Jackie Robinson broke the color bar-
rier in major league baseball. 127
And then, along came Brown v. Board of Education in 1954, overturn-
ing Plessy.128 The discrimination fomented in the educational arena is
perhaps the most insidious legacy Plessy left, as Chief Justice Earl War-
ren's Court recognized in Brown.129 The Court realized the devastating
121. Cumming v. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899).
122. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (2004) (detail-
ing the history of Black Americans' fight for civil rights from Plessy v. Ferguson through
Brown v. Board of Education).
123. Id. at 78 (2004) (describing the early years of the NAACP).
124. Id. (describing these and other activists' efforts to combat civil rights injustices).
125. A Brief Guide to the Harlem Renaissance, http://www.poets.org/viewmedia.php/
prmMID/5657 (last visited Oct. 5, 2009) (explaining that during this era, "[African-Ameri-
cans] were encouraged to celebrate their heritage and to become 'The New Negro,' a term
coined in 1925 by sociologist and critic Alain LeRoy Locke in his influential book of the
same name").
126. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF ED-
UCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 224-27 (2004). Despite Afri-
can-Americans' voluntary and heroic service, the military continued to mandate unit
segregation. Id. at 225.
127. Biography of Jackie Robinson, http://www.jackierobinson.com/about/bio.html
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009) ("When Jackie first donned a Brooklyn Dodger uniform, he pio-
neered the integration of professional athletics in America. By breaking the color barrier
in baseball, the nation's preeminent sport, he courageously challenged the deeply rooted
custom of racial segregation in both the North and the South.").
128. 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954) (rejecting the doctrine of "separate but equal" as
applied to public schools and overturning Plessy's contrary holding regarding segregation
in public transportation).
129. Id. at 494. Quoting the lower court, the Supreme Court stated:
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consequences for African-Americans of the "separate but equal" doc-
trine espoused in Plessy and declared that "[s]eparate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal. 1
30
The Reconstruction and Jim Crow eras had a momentous impact upon
the notion of race in the United States. The end of slavery put great
pressure on the Black/White relationship to change. During this time,
Blacks experienced political power as never before, and Whites suffered
defeat and degradation as never before because they no longer had slav-
ery to funnel Blacks into the vortex of White power.
131
Segregation of [W]hite and [C]olored children in public schools has a detrimental ef-
fect upon the [C]olored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the
law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferi-
ority of the [N]egro group. A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to
learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the
educational and mental development of Negro children and to deprive them of some
of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated school system.
Id. (fifth and sixth alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Id. at 495. The Warren Court stated that "[sleparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal," but the Justices were themselves victimized by instilled racial biases
that colored their thinking. At first glance, the pronouncement that "separate but equal"
was "inherently unequal" seems a welcome salve. But what does this characterization truly
reflect about the Warren Court's perception of Black competency? These words infer that
an organization must have White participation in order to be competent. We believe the
Court had good intentions and Brown has produced positive results; but did Blacks of that
era believe that they needed White participation to validate their institutions?
An 1899 Georgia case decided shortly after Plessy-Cumming v. Board of Education-
sheds light on the issue of whether Blacks in the days of Plessy felt a need for validation
through White participation in their schools. 175 U.S. 528 (1899). In Cumming, Blacks in
Richmond County simply wanted their children to be allowed to attend, free of charge, the
Black high school, just as the White students were allowed to attend, free of charge, the
White high school. Id. at 529-30. The plaintiffs in Cumming did not attack "separate," but
they did attack "equal." Id. at 530-31. It is, thus, evident that the Black plaintiffs did not
believe that separate was inherently unequal, instead believing in their own competency
given the proper tools. See id.
But in Brown, the Supreme Court attempted to alleviate racial discrimination in public
schools and unwittingly revealed its own discriminatory psyche by presuming that Black
people cannot succeed without the physical presence of people of the White race. The
Court presents the fundamental issue in Brown as follows: "Does segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other
'tangible' factors may be equal, deprive the children of the minority group of equal educa-
tional opportunities?" Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). Specifically,
Brown was not about equality of resources, but rather the psychological and social damage
done to Black children when they did not receive an education with White children. See id.
The Court could have more accurately stated that segregation deprived all children, Black
and White, of a comprehensive and worthwhile education, but it did not. Thus, racism, the
progenitor and sine qua non of race, has its veiled features.
131. W. Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for Economic Liberty: Legal Historical,
and Related Considerations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 37-42 (2004).
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In unity with White Republicans and armed with the Thirteenth, Four-
teenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Blacks made significant strides, as
evidenced by cases recognizing the right to intermarry.132 But in the
Slaughter-House Cases and Cruikshank, the Supreme Court upended the
Civil War amendments by giving the states the right to define civil rights,
forcing the federal government to become a secondary player in race
relations. 13
3
State anti-miscegenation laws were used to keep Blacks from integrat-
ing with White society in any meaningful way.'13 But after conscious ef-
forts to avoid the hotbed issue of anti-miscegenation laws, the Supreme
Court finally laid to rest the insidious notion that it was illegal for love to
cross racial boundaries in Loving v. Virginia in 1967.' Evidence
strongly indicates that the Court made a calculated decision not to ad-
dress this issue prior to its decision in Loving in order to give the country
an opportunity to cool down and weather the climate change caused by
Brown, which was decided in 1954.136 Apparently, the Court felt com-
pelled to defer the issue of anti-miscegenation during a time when the
White population was still attempting to comprehend and react to the
broad impact of the Court's decision in Brown.137
C. The "New Identity Politics" of Race
The "new identity politics" of the late twentieth century emphasized an
understanding of race as both an historical and a political construction. 38
The Black Power movement of the 1970s fused race and politics in such a
132. John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of Loving, 51 How.
L.J. 15, 16 n.7 (2007).
133. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. 36, 77 (1872).
134. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (declaring that Virginia's anti-misce-
genation law prohibiting only intermarriage involving Whites was clearly aimed at preserv-
ing and promoting White supremacy).
135. Id. at 11 ("There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of
invidious racial discrimination which justifies this classification.").
136. Christopher W. Schmidt, Essay, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution, 94 COR-
NELL L. REV. 203, 222 (2008) (explaining the Court's rationale for avoiding the racial inter-
marriage issue). At the time Brown was announced, many White Americans were opposed
to interracial marriage. Id. at 222-23. In fact, "[s]egregationists regularly sought to rally
opposition to school desegregation by characterizing it as the first step toward 'open[ing]
the bedroom doors of our [W]hite women to the Negro men."' Id. at 223. After Brown
was decided, the Court continuously denied certiorari to cases involving interracial mar-
riage issues in an effort to avoid explosive social upheaval. Id.
137. Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Vir-
ginia, 1860s-1960s, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371, 415-16 (1994).
138. ROBERT W. CHERNY, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE GILDED AGE, 1868-1900, at
25-26 (1997).
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way that "Blackness" came to signify a political and cultural orienta-
tion.139 Therefore, to affirm "Blackness" in this era of new identity polit-
ics was to also affirm a desire for social change.14° Blacks began to
cultivate "oppositional identities" that were expressions operating within,
but against, the racial and social status quo.141
The clenched, black-gloved fist became a ubiquitous symbol of both
Black pride and Black power; it at once signified Black achievement and
Black defiance, as demonstrated by the salutes of U.S. sprinters Tommie
Smith and John Carlos as they received their medals in the 1968 Summer
Olympics in Mexico City.' 42 Such demonstrations were born out of the
idea that Black achievement (Smith and Carlos won gold and bronze
medals, respectively) could become a vehicle for social protest. 143 More-
over, it reflected an understanding of race (and Blackness) as essentially
performative-that is, derived from certain ideological and cultural prac-
tices. Smith and Carlos literally wore their "Blackness," performing their
racial identities vis-A-vis the ubiquitous symbol of the black glove, which
139. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 138-39 (1980). The Black Power movement supplied
the energy needed to mobilize the Black community to combat unemployment, improve
education, and stop the cycle of poverty. Id.
140. Id.
141. SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE
IN AMERICA 4 (1991) ("[Tjhose who provoke this sort of [racial division] are operating out
of a [B]lack identity that obliges them to badger [W]hite people about race almost on
principle. . . . [T]hese provocations.., are power moves, little shows of power that try to
freeze the 'enemy' in self-consciousness." (emphasis in original)).
142. DOUGLASS HARTMANN, RACE, CULTURE, AND THE REVOLT OF THE BLACK
ATHLETE: THE 1968 OLYMPIC PROTESTS AND THEIR AFTERMATH 4-6 (2003) (describing
how Smith and Carlos raised black-gloved fists in triumph after their victories in the 1968
Mexico City Summer Olympics); see also On This Day: October 17, 1968, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/7/newsid_3535000/3535348.stm (last vis-
ited Oct. 5, 2009) (describing Smith's and Carlos's "silent protest"). For raising their fists
into the air with heads bowed as the American National Anthem played, Smith and Carlos
were booed off the podium by the Mexico City crowd. On This Day: October 17, 1968,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/october/17/newsid-3535000/3535348.stm
(last visited Oct. 5, 2009). At a subsequent press conference, Tommie Smith explained: "If
I win I am an American, not a [B]lack American. But if I did something bad then they
would say 'a Negro.' We are [B]lack and we are proud of being [B]lack. Black America
will understand what we did tonight." Id. Peter Norman, the White silver medalist in the
sprint, was ostracized in his native Australia and publicly reprimanded by the Australian
Olympic Committee for wearing a human rights badge on the podium to show solidarity
with Smith and Carlos. Mike Wise, Clenched Fists, Helping Hand, WASH. POST, Oct. 5,
2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/lO/O4/AR
2006100401753.html.
143. DOUGLASS HARTMANN, RACE, CULTURE, AND THE REVOLT OF THE BLACK
ATHLETE: THE 1968 OLYMPIC PROTESTS AND THEIR AFTERMATH 5-6 (2003).
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itself symbolized a message of social protest and Black defiance in the
context of Black achievement. 44
This idea that race could be performed through distinctive political and
cultural acts relied on an understanding of racial identity as socially con-
structed. Therefore, "Blackness," once defined by the racialist discourse
of the nineteenth century as an irrefutable biological construct, now
emerged as a social and political construct that derived much of its mean-
ing through the interaction of cultural and political practices. This was
the culmination of a kind of racial peregrination in which "Negro" (liter-
ally, a black thing) had given way to "Afro-American" (a Black person in
America), finally to become "African-American" (a person of African
descent in America). The journey from "Negro" to "African-American,"
with every derivation in between (i.e., "Colored," "Mulatto," etc.), was
more than merely a shift in racial nomenclature; it was indicative of a
radical movement from racial essentialism to a kind of racial hyper-fluid-
ity, wherein "Blackness" was negotiated in the hyphenated interstices be-
tween "African" and "American." In short, to be "Black" after the 1960s
was to assert a kind of racial self-determination in which the terms under-
writing Blackness could be (re)defined.
The crucial importance of (re)defining "Blackness" in this era of new
identity politics is nowhere more apparent than in Toni Morrison's first
novel, The Bluest Eye.145 Published in 1970, the novel approaches the
problem of internalized racism through the central perspective of its nar-
rator, Claudia MacTeer, who recounts the tragic story of her childhood
friend, Pecola Breedlove, whose unrealizable desire for "beauty" in the
form of blue eyes ultimately leads to her disillusionment and insanity.14 6
Suspicious of popular racial slogans valorizing "Black beauty,"' 47 Morri-
144. Id. at 6.
My raised right hand stood for the power in [B]lack America. Carlos's raised left
hand stood for the unity of [Bilack America. Together they formed an arch of unity
and power. The black scarf around my neck stood for [B]lack pride. The black socks
with no shoes stood for [B]lack poverty in racist America. The totality of our effort
was the regaining of [Bilack dignity.
Id. (quoting Tommie Smith's explanation of the protest).
145. See generally TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (Plume/Penguin Books 1994)
(1970) (exploring the complexity of beauty as children understand it). The novel analyzes
the way Black girls are taught to accept only Whiteness and White features as beautiful,
while Blackness and Black features are considered less attractive.
146. See generally id.
147. See TONI MORRISON, PLAYING IN THE DARK: WHITENESS AND THE LITERARY
IMAGINATION 5 (1994) (exploring "[Bilack presence" in the novels of the most notable
authors in the American literary canon). Because these authors are mostly White and
male, Morrison contends that their works construct Blackness as the "other," a foil against
which the ideals of Whiteness and beauty are imbued with meaning and racialized ideals of
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son sets out in the novel to interrogate perceptions of beauty based on an
acknowledgement of race. 148 As Morrison understood, even ideals of
"Black beauty," which functioned as a response to racist assumptions
about the undesirability of Black skin, relied on a similar set of racial
values that posited inherent value in "Blackness" as beautiful. 149 When
Black classmates ridicule Morrison's tragic protagonist for being "too
Black," the author acknowledges the tacit assumption that Black is ugly
only by degrees.15 Inversely, classmates hold up Maureen Peale, a Black
girl of mixed racial background, as a model of Black beauty because of
her fair skin. 5' What this comparison reveals is that racialized defini-
tions of beauty (e.g., "Black beauty") re-inscribe racial differences even
as they seek to minimize the negative effects of those differences.
Morrison's novel also points to the construction of "Whiteness" vis-A-
vis the negative meanings ascribed to "Blackness.' ' 152 In one passage,
Morrison's narrator recalls her obsession with White dolls and uncover-
ing the "secret" of their "[W]hiteness.' ' 153 The passage is worth quoting
at length:
I had only one desire: to dismember [the doll]. To see of what it was
made, to discover the dearness, to find the beauty, the desirability
that had escaped me, but apparently only me. Adults, older girls,
shops, magazines, newspapers, window signs-all the world had
agreed that a blue-eyed, yellow-haired, pink-skinned doll was what
every girl child treasured . . . I could not love it. But I could ex-
amine it to see what it was that all the world said was lovable. Break
off the tiny fingers, bend the flat feet, loosen the hair, twist the head
around, and the thing made one sound-a sound they said was the
sweet and plaintive cry "Mama," but which sounded to me like the
bleat of a dying lamb, or, more precisely, our icebox door opening on
rust hinges in July.15 4
Although the novel interrogates "Blackness" as a construction-particu-
larly the ideological baggage it carries in the form of "internalized ra-
cism"-it also deconstructs the concept of "Whiteness" as a positive
beauty and aesthetic value that rely on the privileging of one racial category over another.
Id.
148. See generally TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE (Plume/Penguin Books 1994)
(1970).
149. See generally id.
150. See generally id.
151. See id. at 62 (describing Maureen Peal as a "high-yellow dream child").
152. See generally id.
153. TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 62 (Plume/Penguin Books 1994) (1970).
154. Id.
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ideal. 155 In this binary pairing of terms, "Whiteness" accrues value in
direct correlation with the negative value assigned to "Blackness." Clau-
dia's de(con)structive act of disassembling the White dolls represents her
attempt to dissemble "Whiteness." By revealing the constructed nature
of the dolls-and, by extension, the constructedness of race in general-
she effectively (re)inscribes "Blackness" with positive value. The novel
thereby conveys an understanding of race in general, and "Blackness" in
particular, as malleable concepts within the political and cultural context
of American society.
More recently, however, there has been some resistance to the idea
that race is a malleable construct.' 5 6 The "new identity politics" that be-
came a major component of Black Studies in the 1970s and provided
much of the conceptual basis for the multicultural and revisionist move-
ments of the 1980s and 1990s has recently given way to a retrenchment of
essentialist racial attitudes that reject the view of race as constructed. 15 7
Instead, many African-Americans have come to view "Blackness" as a
natural category of distinction.' 58 As Black Studies scholar, Paul Gilroy,
points out, this movement toward racial essentialism is largely the result
of an expressed desire to reinvest the concept of "Blackness" with posi-
tive value over and against the negative meanings that historically have
been assigned to it.'5 9 In response to this reactionary mode of thinking,
Gilroy warns of the following:
When ideas of racial particularity are inverted in this defensive man-
ner so that they provide sources of pride rather than shame and hu-
miliation, they become difficult to relinquish. For many racialized
populations, "race" and the hard-won, oppositional identities it sup-
ports are not to be lightly or prematurely given up.'60
Indeed, what such individuals would have to "give up" is the essentialist
notion that race is biologically inherited. Instead, they would have to un-
derstand race as a political and social construct-in short, as an assigned,
rather than biological, feature of one's identity. 161
155. See id. (describing the narrator's fascination with White baby dolls, which are
given to her as symbols of beauty).
156. Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1093, 1093-94 (2004).
157. Id.
158. PAUL GILROY, AGAINST RACE: IMAGING POLITICAL CULTURE BEYOND THE
COLOR LINE 12 (2000).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 12-13.
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III. CODIFICATION OF RACE AS AN IDENTITY IN FEDERAL, STATE,
AND LOCAL LAWS
There is a wide range of laws on the federal, state, and local levels that
make reference to "race" and/or the categorization of "African-Ameri-
can/Black" as either a protected class or simply as a subject of classifica-
tion for a multiplicity of purposes.'62 Since the abolition of slavery and
the passage of civil rights laws in subsequent years, most such references
generally have changed in character from being punitive to protective or
ameliorative in nature. 63 In fact, many of these laws provide special ben-
efits and opportunities to persons who are classified as African-Ameri-
can/Black, but are not intended for or as available to Whites. 164
It is most likely a safe assumption that hordes of White Americans
have not attempted to be legally classified as African-American in order
to take advantage of whatever benefits might inure by virtue of being so
classified, but it has occurred. An example of the jurisprudential difficul-
ties encountered in defining race is the case of the "Mixed-Up
Malones. ' ' 165  The Malones were twin brothers applying for jobs as
162. Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1093, 1104 (2004).
[NIumerous statutes establish[ing] additional anti-discrimination mandates ... apply
to the following: housing, interethnic adoptions, programs and entities receiving fed-
eral funding, personnel decisions made by governmental entities and unions, insurancc
providers offering policies to government employees, state food stamp programs, the
granting of visas, naturalization, refugee assistance and services, membership in veter-
ans' associations and other organizations linked with the armed forces, the Olympic
Committee, banking, mortgages, credit, jury service, criminal justice, education, for-
eign policy, highway projects, tax law, local government programs, public health poli-
cies, voting rights, disaster assistance, aviation, and other areas.
Id. at 1104-06 (footnotes omitted).
163. Id. at 1104-05.
164. Id.
165. Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in
Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1232-34 (1994) (analyzing the impact of the
Malones' case, which led to investigations of eleven other firefighters for similar decep-
tion); Luther Wright, Jr., Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the
United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REV. 513, 515-17
(1995) (examining the Malones' case and considering the difficulties in differentiating
among individuals by race). Wright also discusses the case of Stockton, California City
Councilman, Mark Stebbins, who was accused of lying about his race in order to win votes.
Luther Wright, Jr., Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualizing the
United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REV. 513, 515-17
(1995). Stebbins claimed to be Black, despite the fact that he had a light complexion,
brown hair, and blue eyes. Id. In addition, though Stebbins's birth certificate listed his
grandparents and parents as White, he was nevertheless accepted as Black by many Black
community leaders. Id. at 517. There have been increasing abuses of affirmative action
programs where applicants for university admission may have fabricated minority racial
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firefighters who changed their racial classification from White to Black in
order to be eligible for a racial hiring preference. 166 Their pretense was
discovered when they sought promotion. 167 A hearing officer determined
that the Malones were not Black and had falsified their applications, and
they were, thus, promptly fired.168
Interestingly, the Malones appealed on the basis that they had ascer-
tained their race through "self-identification.' ' 169 The court, however, did
not accept that justification.17 ° The court applied a three-part test to de-
termine whether the Malones were Black: "(1) by visual observation of
their features; (2) by appropriate documentary evidence, such as birth
certificates establishing Black ancestry; or (3) by evidence that they or
their families hold themselves out to be Black and are considered to be
Black in the community."17' We can see from this case the potential for
fraud and the need for an objective standard.
Most laws that pertain to African-Americans pertain to other classifica-
tions of minorities as well. 172 Thus, in this examination there will not
normally be a need to distinguish between an African-American and any
other non-White person; that assessment simply is beyond the scope of
this Article. There are few laws that are directed solely at African-Amer-
icans to the exclusion of other minorities. 173 It should also be noted that
courts generally interpret various civil rights laws to allow Whites to be
status. Tseming Yang, Choice and Fraud in Racial Identification: The Dilemma of Policing
Race in Affirmative Action, the Census, and a Color-Blind Society, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L.
367, 369 (2006). "There have even been reports of systematic efforts to find such connec-
tions via genetic analysis." Id.
166. Tseming Yang, Choice and Fraud in Racial Identification: The Dilemma of Polic-
ing Race in Affirmative Action, the Census, and a Color-Blind Society, 11 MICH. J. RACE &
L. 367, 368 (2006).
167. Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: The Determination of "Race" in
Race-Conscious Law, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1994). Because the Boston Fire Depart-
ment was court-ordered to implement an affirmative action program, the twins' test scores
from the 1977 application were considered high enough for both twins to be hired if they
were Black, even though their scores would not have been high enough for a White candi-
date to be considered for employment. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1233-34.
171. Id. at 1233. Ultimately, the Malone twins were determined not to be Black under
the three-part test. Id. The court determined that they were both fair-skinned, with light
hair coloring and Caucasian facial features. Id. Also, the twins' birth certificates proved
that the families had held themselves out as White for the past three generations. Id. Last,
there was sufficient evidence to prove that the twins had reported that they were Black
only for the "purpose of claiming jobs and promotion in the Fire Department." Id.
172. Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1093, 1104-06 (2004).
173. Id.
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considered a "protected class" as well.174 Yet, as this Article discusses,
the "class" must nonetheless be defined.
It is also not the purpose of this Article to debate or contribute to the
expansive literary discourse on the validity of any such programs or pro-
tections, nor concomitantly to engage in the debate of whether vestiges of
discrimination remain in our society for which such protections are neces-
sary. Rather, in this part, our stated purpose is simply this: to examine a
few of the key laws that currently exist and critically analyze how these
laws define "African-American/Black" as a racial category, if at all.
What we present here is a vexing need for clarification-to point out a
definitional deficiency that exposes a flaw in the system.
A. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, passed during the Reconstruction Era,
was one of the earliest laws that referred to race as a class for which its
protections were designed. 75 This law was adopted as an effort to
counter the laws known as "Black Codes," which Southern states passed
after the abolition of slavery in an effort to keep former slaves in practical
bondage by denying them certain basic rights. 176 The act is now codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which states, in part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every [s]tate and [t]erritory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and
property as is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.177
Section 1981 does not specifically refer to or define African-Americans as
a race, but by referring to "[W]hite" citizens, it implicitly distinguishes
between those who are White and those who are non-White.178 Never-
174. See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 295-96 (1976)
(holding that anti-discrimination laws apply to discrimination against White people);
DeMatteis v. Eastman Kodak Co., 511 F.2d 306, 312 (2d Cir. 1975) (upholding the right for
a White person to sue for a civil rights violation).
175. Civil Rights Act of 1866 § 1, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
176. John Harrison, State Sovereign Immunity and Congress's Enforcement Powers,
2006 Sup. Cr. REV. 353, 363.
177. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
178. Id. "Non-White" can refer to any "ethnic" grouping of people. Merriam-Web-
ster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.comldictionary/nonwhite (last visited
Oct. 5, 2009) (defining a "non-[WJhite" person as "a person whose features and especially
whose skin color are distinctively different from those of peoples of northwestern Europe;
especially: one who has [B]lack African ancestors" (emphasis in original)).
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theless, it must be said that courts have held that White plaintiffs, as well
as Black plaintiffs, may bring racial discrimination claims, as each racial
group is considered a member of a protected class. 1 79 Some suggest there
should be a shift away from racial status to racist acts in determining who
is entitled to bring a discrimination claim. t80 These same authors make
the argument that race cannot be defined, stating: "The courts have at-
tempted to define race in terms of the predominant dichotomies of
[W]hite, [Bilack, and other color-defined groupings. But this effort is
misguided because race is an inherently irrational and subjective
concept."' 81
In response, we say this: as long as there are racist acts there is a need
to address issues of race. One cannot address issues of race without rec-
ognizing that there are distinct "races" of people as that term has come to
be known in this country. Although racism is irrational, race is not.
Rather than illusory, which denotes a subjective concept, race is objec-
tive, or "without bias or prejudice."' 82
To bring an action alleging a violation of § 1981 and to establish a
prima facie case of intentional racial discrimination, a plaintiff must es-
tablish membership in a protected class. 18 3 Even though a White person
may be an aggrieved plaintiff in a § 1981 claim and would, therefore, fall
within a protected class, there must nevertheless be some identification of
that person's "race" in order to bring a claim of racial discrimination.' 84
One cannot claim to have been discriminated against on the basis of race
without specifying one's own racial identity. And so we have reached the
need for definition.
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) outlaws discrimination in a broad
range of areas including voter registration (Title I), public accommoda-
tions (Title II), public facilities (Title III), government agencies receiving
179. E.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 295-96.
180. See, e.g., Linda A. Lacewell & Paula Shelowitz, Comment, Beyond a Black and
White Reading of Sections 1981 and 1982: Shifting the Focus from Racial Status to Racist
Acts, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 823, 824 (1987) (discussing the ambiguous and contradictory
views taken by courts in defining race).
181. Id. (footnote omitted).
182. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1103 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "objective" as "[o]f,
relating to, or based on externally verifiable phenomena, as opposed to an individual's
perceptions, feelings, or intentions").
183. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
184. Id.
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federal funding (Title VI), and employment (Title VII). 18 5 The CRA pro-
hibits discrimination with respect to five "protected classes": race, color,
religion, sex, and national origin." 6
The CRA attempts to legislatively define what the terms "religion" and
"sex" encompass, 187 but provides no definition of "race." 18' As with
§ 1981 claims, one does not have to be a minority to qualify for protection
under the CRA.1 89 As one author notes:
Of course, it has long been established that one need not be a racial
minority in order to qualify for [CRA] protection-members of the
"majority" race may also allege racial discrimination. But while the
circuits are split as to the showing required of a person of the major-
ity category, whether under a purely symmetrical scheme or under a
requirement where the "majority" plaintiff must meet a stricter
"background circumstances" test.... the plaintiff [is still required] to
allege his race in order to establish his case.1 90
Thus, whether one is considered White or a member of a minority group,
a person's race remains a factor that must be proven in an action for
violation of a civil rights law.1 91
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is the pri-
mary enforcement agency for carrying out the mandates of the CRA.1 9
2
Pursuant to Title VII of the CRA, the EEOC requires employers to file
an annual report known as the EEO-1, which must contain, inter alia,
information regarding the races of the company's employees. 193
185. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-1-2000h-6 (2006)).
186. Id. § 201(a).
187. Id. § 701(j), (k).
188. Ken Nakasu Davison, Comment, The Mixed-Race Experience: Treatment of Ra-
cially Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161, 166-67 (2005) (dis-
cussing the confusion created by Congress's failure to define "race" in the CRA). The
omission of a definition for race has led to uncertainty over what constitutes racial discrim-
ination. Id. at 167. Although there is no actual definition of race in the CRA, the legisla-
tive history shows that Congress intended for the definition of race to be broad. Id.
189. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 293 (1976).
190. Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1151, 1189 (citing
McDonald, 427 U.S. at 290-96).
191. Id.
192. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (2006) ("The Commis-
sion is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any
unlawful employment practice as set forth in section 2000e-2 or 2000e-3 of this title.").
193. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2009) (requiring all employers with one hundred or more
employees to file an "Employer Information Report EEO-1").
On or before September 30 of each year, every employer that is subject to title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, and that has [one hundred] or more employ-
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The EEOC has published an instruction booklet to provide guidance in
completing the EEO-1. t9 4 In the appendix to this booklet, the "Race and
Ethnic Identification" section states that "[rlace and ethnic designations
as used by the [EEOC] do not denote scientific definitions of anthropo-
logical origins" and defines various "racial" categories. 9 5 Under this sec-
tion, a non-Latino "Black or African-American" person is defined as "[a]
person having origins in any of the [B]lack racial groups of Africa." '196
There are deficiencies in this definition. How does one prove his or her
"origins"? As we discuss in Part IV of this Article, there are credible
genealogical organizations that provide origin-tracing services. 197 Utiliz-
ing an organization such as these can be helpful, but these services are
expensive and often futile, since so many of the ancestral records of those
people who were brought to this country as slaves are untraceable.1 98
Even though this process can prove useful, it should not be the only
means by which one can establish oneself as Black or African-American.
Secondly, are there really "Black racial groups" in Africa? In his pro-
posal for the creation of a biracial category, Luther Wright, Jr. notes that
the EEOC was forced to use the term "origins in the [B]lack racial groups
of Africa"' 99 because the EEOC definition of non-Latino "White" in-
ees shall file with the Commission or its delegate executed copies of Standard Form
100, as revised (otherwise known as "Employer Information Report EEO-1") in con-
formity with the directions set forth in the form and accompanying instructions.
Id.
194. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY STANDARD FORM 100, REV. JAN. 2006, EMPLOYER INFORMATION REPORT
EEO-1 INSTRUcTION BOOKLET 4 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoll
instruction-rev 2006.pdf.
195. Id.
196. Id. This definition for Black or African-American people references only origins
and geographic prescriptions. Id. In contrast, the definition for a White person is "a per-
son having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North
Africa." Id. The distinctive use of the words "original peoples" and the geographic pre-
scriptions raise questions that may form the basis for a companion Article that would per-
haps be sardonically titled: "Is Obama White?"
197. These organizations include the International Commission for the Accreditation
of Professional Genealogists, located in Utah and formerly associated with the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and the internationally recognized Board for Certifica-
tion of Genealogists, located in Washington, D.C.
198. "For many [African-Americans], tracking down ancestors can present a unique
set of challenges-few cultural groups face as many obstacles when it comes to family
history research. Often, a lack of credible documentation can make the journey both diffi-
cult and time-consuming." African American Research Center, Learn All About African
American Records, http://www.ancestry.com/learn/contentcenters/contentCenter.aspx?
page=AfricanAm (last visited Oct. 5, 2009).
199. Luther Wright, Jr., Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualiz-
ing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REV. 513,
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cludes people "having origins in any of the original peoples of Europe,
the Middle East, or North Africa.' '2 ' The EEOC definition appears to
raise more questions than it presumes to answer. In the definition of
"Black" proposed in Part IV of this Article, we do not presume to de-
velop a perfect solution to a conundrum that defies defining with exacti-
tude; rather, we attempt to seek a rational solution with minimal flaws
and with recognition of the historical and socio-political contextual basis.
A plaintiff has the burden of proving that he or she is a member of a
protected class. 2 11 As Wright explains, "The issue of racial classification,
therefore, could become a major barrier to the claims of many future
plaintiffs, particularly if employers are able to produce compelling evi-
dence of a perception different than that of the employee. 2 °2 Because
the EEO-1 report is used for data collection purposes, the definitions
contained therein are not necessarily conclusive as to who is an African-
American for purposes of determining whether one is a member of a
"protected class" within the meaning of the civil rights statutes.20 3 Never-
theless, the definition exists, and the need for uniformity goes begging.2 4
It should be noted that, generally, people will self-identify for purposes
of the EEO-1 report. 20 5 The guidelines state: "Self-identification is the
preferred method of identifying the race and ethnic information neces-
sary for the EEO-1 report. Employers are required to attempt to allow
employees to use self-identification to complete the EEO-1 report. If an
employee declines to self-identify, employment records or observer iden-
tification may be used. '20 6 But self-identification raises concerns that we
will not discuss in depth here.20 7 Suffice it to say that self-identification
538 (1995). Wright argues that defining the Black race by using the term "Black" frus-
trates attempts to establish a working definition of race. Id.
200. Id. at 569 n.150 (emphasis added).
201. Id. at 554.
202. Id.
203. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY STANDARD FORM 100, REV. JANUARY 2006, EMPLOYER INFORMATION RE-
PORT EEO-1 INSTRUCTION BOOKLET 4 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeol/
instruction_rev_2006.pdf.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. OFFICE OF FED. CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY COMM'N, OMB No. 3046-0007, EMPLOYER INFORMATION REPORT EEO-1 IN-
STRUCTION BOOKLET (2006).
207. See Keneisha M. Green, Comment, Who's Who: Exploring the Discrepancy Be-
tween the Methods of Defining African Americans and Native Americans, 31 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 93, 107 (2006) ("As much as an individual may wish to identify himself with a particu-
lar race, this desire takes a backseat to the will of society.").
2010]
THE SCHOLAR
does not provide an objective basis for achieving bona fide uniformity.
Yet self-identification is the primary means used for the U.S. Census.2 °8
As cited above, the EEO-1 report guidelines also provide: "If an em-
ployee declines to self-identify, employment records or observer identifi-
cation may be used. ' 20 9 The first question that arises is what employment
records are going to be used and what is the basis for ascertaining race
from those forms? Then, if the racial identity cannot be derived from
employment records, the person completing the form must resort to "ob-
server identification., 210 Needless to say, such a subjective method of
identification is fraught with the possibility of error in many cases.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is the federal agency
responsible for developing guidelines for the collection of data and re-
cordkeeping concerning race in federal programs.21' In 1997, the OMB
issued a new directive entitled "Standards for Maintaining, Collecting,
and Presenting Federal Data on Race and Ethnicity., 212 The new direc-
tive was the result of various groups putting pressure on the OMB to
recognize different racial groups.21 3 The OMB also states a preference
for self-identification, stating: "[I]t is useful to remember that these deci-
sions ... underscore that self-identification is the preferred means of ob-
taining information about an individual's race and ethnicity, except in
instances where observer identification is more practical (e.g., completing
a death certificate) .... "214
In its background statement, the OMB clarifies: "The [racial] catego-
ries represent a social-political construct designed for collecting data on
the race and ethnicity of broad population groups in this country, and are
not anthropologically or scientifically based., 211 The definition of Afri-
208. Naomi Mezey, Erasure and Recognition: The Census, Race and the National Im-
agination, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 1701, 1718-19 (2003) ("[The Census] is a regularly adminis-
tered, probing questionnaire, to which the state requires a response, inquiring into myriad
details of life which are at once mundane and intimate." (emphasis added)).
209. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY STANDARD FORM 100, REV. JANUARY 2006, EMPLOYER INFORMATION RE-
PORT EEO-1 INSTRUCTION BOOKLET 4 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeol/
instruction-rev -2006.pdf.
210. Id.
211. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58782, 57787-88 (Oct. 30, 1997).
212. Id.
213. Hiroshi Fukurai, A Collaborative Work with La Raza Law Journal: Social De-
Construction of Race and Affirmative Action in Jury Selection, 4 AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y
REP. 17, 31 (1999).
214. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58782, 58785 (Oct. 30, 1997).
215. Id. at 58782 (relating the purpose of the OMB's standards for classifying race and
ethnicity data). The standards provide a "common language to promote uniformity and
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can-American, according to OMB guidelines, 216 appears to be the basis
for the definition adopted in the EEO-1 report form.217 The OMB guide-
lines state: "Terms such as 'Haitian' or 'Negro' can be used in addition to
'Black or [African-American].' "218 In this statement, the OMB recog-
nizes "race" as a socio-political construct, rather than a scientifically
based construct for which many, including the American Anthropological
Association, have argued.21 9 It is also interesting to note that the defini-
tion treats "Haitian" as synonymous with "Black," "African-American,"
and "Negro. '220 This inclusion certainly leaves one querying as to what
other geographical groupings might obtain their own politically correct
moniker.
C. Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) states, in part:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any [s]tate or politi-
cal subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement
of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color .... 221
comparability" for information on race. Id. The passage of civil rights laws spurred the
federal government to establish standards in order to ensure that the laws were enforced.
Id. Federal agencies participated in the development of the standards, which are now used
to oversee equal access in housing, among other areas, for groups that have traditionally
experienced racial discrimination. Id.; see also 85 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 26, 2000 WL 151225
(answering inquiry about use of racial and ethnic identification forms in Maryland).
216. Id. at 58789.
217. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OP-
PORTUNITY STANDARD FORM 100, REV. JANUARY 2006, EMPLOYER INFORMATION RE-
PORT EEO-1 INSTRUCTION BOOKLET 4 (2006), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/eeol/
instruction rev 2006.pdf.
218. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58788, 57789 (Oct. 30, 1997).
219. Am. Anthropological Ass'n Statement on "Race," http://www.understanding
grace.org/about/statement.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2009).
220. Revisions to the Standards for the Classification of Federal Data on Race and
Ethnicity, 62 Fed. Reg. 58788, 57788 (Oct. 30, 1997). The introduction of the classification
"Haitian" to this racial group adds a different feature to the discussion which these authors
will resist further commenting upon in this Article.
221. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (prohibiting any
voter qualification or prerequisites from denying a lawful voter from voting in any state or
political subdivision within the United States); cf Sean Flynn, Comment, One Person, One
Vote, One Application: District Court Decision in Ray v. Texas Upholds Texas Absentee
Voting Law That Disenfranchises Elderly and Disabled Voters, 11 SCHOLAR 469, 498-99
(2009) (discussing the disenfranchising impact of absentee ballot rules upon elderly and
minority voters in Texas).
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Thus, the issue of race remains a prominent one in modern jurisprudence.
For instance, Black voters brought a 2009 federal case pursuant to section
2 of the VRA, alleging that they were denied the opportunity to elect a
sufficient number of Black school board members.222 The court had to
first consider the Thornburg v. Gingles223 factors necessary to establish a
violation of the VRA, i.e.: "(1) the minority group is sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a majority in one or more single
member districts; (2) the minority is politically cohesive, i.e., tends to vote
as a bloc; and (3) the majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to
usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate." 224 After analyzing the
Thornburg factors, the court then determined, under the totality of the
circumstances, that the Black voters were denied an equal opportunity to
elect Black school board members.225
This case is, thus, illustrative of the reality of how race is considered in
deciding cases of this nature. The court examined hard data reflecting a
disparity in the treatment of Black and White voters in the school board
elections.226 In this case and others, voters are categorized by race in a
manner that affects the political lives and futures of elected officials and
their constituents.
The provision of the VRA that has had the most marked impact is
section 5.227 Section 5 of the VRA generally requires state and local gov-
ernments to obtain pre-clearance from the federal government before im-
plementing any change with respect to local or statewide voting
procedures.228 The pre-clearance requirements of section 5 apply to
those jurisdictions that historically were the most rampant violators of the
voting rights of African-American citizens.229 A jurisdiction must obtain
pre-clearance for certification that any proposed change to any one of a
broad range of voting procedures is not discriminatory in effect or pur-
pose.23° Thus, the burden of proof is upon the jurisdiction.231
222. Etheridge v. Lexington County, S.C. Sch. Dist. Three, No. 3:03-3093-MBS, 2009
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13385 (D. S.C. Feb. 19, 2009).
223. 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986); see Appendix to this Article.
224. Etheridge, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *15 (citing Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 50-51).
225. Id. at *48, *58.
226. Id. at *15.
227. Mark E. Haddad, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94
YALE L.J. 139, 139 (1984).
228. Id. at 140-41.
229. Daniel P. Tokaji, If It's Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance,
49 How. L.J. 785, 812-19 (2006).
230. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006). Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act provides unique procedural protection to specified minorities. Mark E.
Haddad, Getting Results Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 94 YALE L.J. 139, 140
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The kinds of proposed changes that would require pre-clearance affect
virtually every aspect of voting procedures in a jurisdiction. As one
scholar explains:
Changes affecting voting include: changes in methods of election,
districting plans, annexations, rules for candidate qualifying, proce-
dures for casting write-in votes, and locations of polling places.
Thus, the federal government must scrutinize and approve every-
thing from a city's annexation of vacant land to a state's adoption of
new congressional districts.232
Inevitably, what is at stake in these kinds of cases is whether changes to
voting procedures are affecting the voting power, voting influence, or vot-
ing ability of African-Americans (or other minorities), which may result
in a jurisdiction's efforts to prove numerical and/or proportional impact
to disprove discriminatory effect or purpose.233 Hence, a determination
may be required at some point, either implicitly or explicitly, as to who is
and who is not an African-American (or other minority) within a particu-
lar locale. The VRA does not define race.2 34 Thus, how does one go
about proving, for example, that a particular district is or is not comprised
of a majority of African-Americans (or other minority group) absent a
definitive basis for arriving at such a conclusion?
D. Fair Housing Act Section 3604(a)
The Fair Housing Act (FHA) states, in part:
[Ilt shall be unlawful -
(a) To refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or
to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.
(b) To discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of ser-
(1984). Never before in the history of the United States has Congress required state and
local governments to submit new laws to the federal government for approval. Id. at 141.
231. Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 538 (1973).
232. Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?,
81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 234-35 (2003) (footnotes omitted).
233. Pursuant to the Supreme Court's 1976 decision in Beer v. United States, the effect
standard has a specialized meaning and is violated only when a voting change "would lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise
of the electoral franchise." Mark A. Posner, Time Is Still on Its Side: Why Congressional
Reauthorization of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Propor-
tional Response to Our Nation's History of Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 51, 68 (2006) (quoting Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)).
234. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006).
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vices or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, re-
ligion, sex, familial status, or national origin.235
As with other federal statutes we have analyzed in this Article, courts
have determined that a plaintiff must establish membership in a pro-
tected class in order to make a prima facie case of discrimination under
the FHA.236 Thus, to make a prima facie showing of racial discrimina-
tion, a plaintiff must establish (a) his or her racial identity, and (b) that
his or her race was the basis for the discriminatory treatment.237 Courts
may likely determine, just as they have under other civil rights statutes,
that a person may be both White and part of a "protected class. ' ' 238 But
it would be rare, indeed, that a White person would be suing for not being
allowed to reside in a predominantly Black housing development, and we
have not been able to find any cases of this sort. But race is still a critical
factor that must be proven in these types of cases if one alleges the denial
of a dwelling place on a racially discriminatory basis. 23 9
E. Set-Asides and Government Contracts
In a post-Croson/Adarand environment, the courts strictly scrutinize
any law that uses race as a basis for awarding contractual preferences.24 °
Both of these cases involved minority set-aside programs for government
contracts on a state and federal level, respectively.241 The U.S. Supreme
Court essentially held that any program for which race was utilized as a
preference would be subject to strict scrutiny.242
As a result of these decisions, most federal and state set-aside pro-
grams have been modified away from a "racial" focus to a focus upon
235. Fair Housing Act § 804(a)-(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(b) (2006).
236. Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F. 2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979).
237. Id.
238. There have been cases where Whites were plaintiffs in actions brought under the
Fair Housing Act, but these cases involved a question of standing where the White person
sued as an "aggrieved person" based on the White person's association with a Black per-
son. See, e.g., Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 115 (1979) (holding that area
residents and a village had standing to bring suit against real estate brokers who were
"steering" home buyers to different residential areas based on race); Woods-Drake v.
Lundy, 667 F. 2d 1198, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that "so long as race of plaintiffs'
guests was a significant factor in defendant's decision to evict plaintiffs, the eviction was in
violation of Section 1982 and of the Fair Housing Act").
239. E.g., Ragin v. New York Times Co., 923 F.2d 995, 1000 (2d Cir. 1991); Robinson,
610 F.2d at 1038; Portis v. River House Assocs., No. 06-cv-2123, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76817, *10-14 (M.D. P.A. Sept. 30, 2008).
240. Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227-38 (1995); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 472 (1989).
241. Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. at 207; J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 471.
242. Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. at 227; J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 493.
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businesses that may be deemed socially disadvantaged.243 For example,
the Small Business Administration lowered the burden of proving disad-
vantage for non-minority businesses from clear and convincing evidence
to a preponderance of the evidence so that they could participate in the
Small Disadvantaged Business (SDB) program.244 In addition, the pre-
sumption that "race" constitutes a disadvantage, thus enabling a minority
business to qualify as an SDB, became a rebuttable presumption.245
Government agencies are, thus, adopting race-neutral policies in
awarding government contracts to businesses.24 6 Nevertheless, in seeking
to be awarded these highly competitive, lucrative government contracts,
businesses will strive to garner every competitive edge possible. Al-
though "race" may no longer be an irrefutable presumption of disadvan-
tage, it probably does not hurt a company's chances of winning contracts
if the company employs qualified minorities, particularly if the contract is
awarded in a field where minorities have been underrepresented.247
The Department of Justice suggests that race may still be one of the
factors to be considered in awarding these contracts.2 48 With so much at
stake in these lucrative contracts, businesses have and will continue to
attempt to fraudulently represent their eligibility for these special set-
asides.2 49 Thus, it remains imperative that government regulations pro-
vide precise racial definitions.
IV. AN APOLOGETIC FOR RE-IDENTIFICATION AND A PROPOSAL
FOR CHANGE
A. The Complexities of Defining-Comparison to Native Americans
The federal and state governments have a long history of making ef-
forts to definitively resolve the question of who is and who is not an "In-
dian" or "Native American. '25 ° Indeed, within the Native American
community itself there is a divergence of opinion as to who is entitled to
243. Patricia C. Bradley, Affirmative Action or Passive Participation in Perpetuating
Discrimination? The Future of Race-Based Preferences in Government Contracting, 2008-
FEB. ARMY LAW 24, 36.
244. Id. at 34.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 31-32.
247. Id. at 38.
248. Patricia C. Bradley, Affirmative Action or Passive Participation in Perpetuating
Discrimination? The Future of Race-Based Preferences in Government Contracting, 2008-
FEB. ARMY LAW 24, 31-32.
249. See Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 275, 279 (2001) (discuss-
ing non-Indians' false claims to tribal land grants).
250. Id. at 278.
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tribal membership and the benefits pertaining to that membership.251
Different Native American tribes have varying methods of determining
who should be considered a member of that tribe.252
A five-factor test was developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
certify Native Americans for benefits available through the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934.253 These five factors are: "1) tribal rolls; 2) testi-
mony of the applicant; 3) affidavits from people familiar with the
applicant; 4) findings of an anthropologist; and 5) testimony of the appli-
cant that he has retained a 'considerable measure of Native American
culture and habits of living."' 2 54 This five-factor test, however, has met
resistance. On a political level, the test has faced challenges because of
the perception that it gives insufficient deference to tribal sovereignty
and self-determination.255 On a legal level, the test has been challenged
as an unconstitutional law that is based, at least in part, upon racial
characteristics.
2 56
No uniform basis for determining whether a person can be legally clas-
sified as "Indian" or "Native American" has emerged. Congress has
deemed it prudent, both because of constitutional concerns and the con-
cerns of tribal sovereignty and self-determination, to shift the statutory
language from requirements that would focus upon racial and descent
issues to a designation that defers to membership within a tribal organiza-
tion 7.25  But variances remain in the laws on both the federal and state
There is no one definition of "Indian" that serves all federal purposes. According to
one congressional survey, federal legislation contains over thirty-three different defini-
tions of the term "Indian." Both the federal government and the courts have defined
the term "Indian" for many purposes, including eligibility for social programs, jurisdic-
tion in criminal matters, preference in government hiring, and administration and dis-
tribution of tribal property.
Id.
251. Id. at 308 ("Definitions vary among the tribes, but most require blood quantum
or descent from a tribal member. Beyond that, tribes require varying degrees of blood
quantum for membership eligibility, anywhere from one-half degree of tribal blood to no
blood requirement at all.").
252. Id.
253. Keneisha M. Green, Comment, Who's Who: Exploring the Discrepancy Between
the Methods of Defining African Americans and Native Americans, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV.
93, 95 (2006).
254. Id. (footnote omitted). This test proved ineffective in successfully establishing
Native American roots because it excluded people who, by blood, were considered Native
American but could not establish Native American ancestry or did not exude Native
American characteristics. Id.
255. Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 288 (2001).
256. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
257. Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275,298-99 (2001).
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levels for defining who is and who is not a Native American for purposes
of legal benefits and protections.258
Utilizing the Native American paradigm for the concluding task before
us-i.e., to create a means for uniformly and legally defining who is an
"African-American"-is problematic at best and may, in fact, prove
counterintuitive. There is no doubt that appropriate comparisons can be
made between the two groups of people. Both groups have suffered both
socially and politically within the culture of this country. Both groups
have had most aspects of their cultural and natural identities stripped
away from them. Both groups have been forced in varying degrees to
assimilate into a culture foreign to their own, but without many of the
normal incidences of inheritance allowed to those of the dominant
culture.
A primary feature lacking within African-American society that does
exist to some degree within the Native American community is the exis-
tence of tribal rolls and/or a method for certifying that a person fits within
a certain tribal group. When African-Americans were transported to this
country as slaves, they were as "travelers without luggage,, 259 bereft of
everything but "their muscle power, their spirit and their soul"' 26  and
deprived of the ability to continue any physical connection with their tri-
bal ancestry. Attempts to reconnect these lineages have in most cases
proven futile and are available only to those few who can afford the ex-
pense involved.261
So where does this leave us? The only definitive basis for determining
whether one is or is not "African-American" or "Black" would be pheno-
typically based, dependent upon racial characteristics, at least to a certain
extent. Consideration would also have to be given to social and cultural
habits-many of the same factors the Supreme Court appeared to find
constitutionally deficient when analyzing the Bureau of Indian Affairs's
five-factor test.262 "The implication is that a race-based criterion such as
258. Id. at 276.
259. Mame-Kouna Tondut-Sdne, The Travel and Transport of Slaves, in FROM CHAINS
TO BONDS: THE SLAVE TRADE REVISITED 15, 19 (2001).
260. Id.
261. "Slave records are difficult to locate and found rarely at NARA." African
American Records, http://www.archives.gov/geneology/heritage/african-american/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 9, 2009).
262. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974); Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is
an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 278 (2001).
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blood quantum is acceptable only as long as it is linked to the require-
ment of membership in a federally recognized tribe., 263
As stated above, there are no tribes in the case of African-Americans,
at least not within this country, nor are there tribal groups that would
likely be federally recognized if they could be traced back to the African
continent. Of course, for President Obama, whose father was born in
Kenya, it would be a simple matter to trace his African heritage. But Mr.
Obama would be more the exception than the rule. Thus, the Native
American paradigm fails in that respect and may prove to be a hurdle
toward reaching a result.
B. The Need to Define
There is a need to define what it is to be "Black" or "African-Ameri-
can." There can be little doubt among most sentient people that vestiges
of racial discrimination remain in this country, notwithstanding the elec-
tion of President Obama and other "people of color, 264 who have at-
tained positions of distinction and wealth. 265 As one scholar succinctly
notes, "[riace still matters. 266
As discussed, there are existing laws that provide benefits and protec-
tions specifically to African-Americans. Without a formal legal definition
of precisely who is entitled to the benefits and protections of these laws,
administration of such laws will remain poorly enforced. There can no
more be a law that prohibits foreign nationals from making contributions
to political elections without defining "foreign national '267 than a law
263. Margo S. Brownell, Note, Who Is an Indian? Searching for an Answer to the
Question at the Core of Federal Indian Law, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 275, 295 (2001)
(footnote omitted).
264. The generic term, "people of color" is used distinctively here, as it has yet to be
ascertained whether President Obama is in fact "Black."
265. Some have argued (with renewed vehemence in light of the election of President
Obama) that there is no longer a need for the various laws that provide benefits and/or
protections to African-Americans. Joseph Williams & Matt Negrin, Affirmative Action
Foes Point to Obama: Say Candidate Is Proof Effort No Longer Needed, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 18, 2008, at 1A, available at 2008 WLNR 5280772.
266. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, Afri-
can Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1265 (1997).
267. 2 U.S.C. § 441e(b) (2006). A "foreign national" is:
(1) a foreign principal ... except that the term "foreign national" shall not include any
individual who is a citizen of the United States; or (2) an individual who is not a citizen
of the United States or a national of the United States ... and who is not lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.
Id. A "foreign principal" is:
(1) a government of a foreign country and a foreign political party; (2) a person
outside of the United States, unless it is established that such person is an individual
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that provides benefits and protections to "African-Americans" without a
legally recognized and precise definition of "African-American."
C. How to Define
To say that there is a need to define in no way relieves the quandary
that embarking on such an endeavor poses. As with the Native American
experience-both on the tribal level, as well as on the state and federal
levels-attempting to reach a consensus as to just who is an African-
American entails pitfalls. And, certainly, it is far easier to adjudicate who
is or is not a foreign national than to determine a "racial" category, since
there are official mechanisms that must be satisfied for establishing one's
citizenship but not one's race.
Professor Christine Hickman correctly asserts that "[s]ince race still
matters, we must be circumspect when presented with proposals to rede-
fine it." '2 68 We must be careful to consider the dynamics of social, politi-
cal, phenotypical, and genealogical factors, as they have worked in
concert to circumscribe a people to a particular racial categorization.
Any attempt at defining must also ensure no unnecessary inclusion or
exclusion that might work to harm the silk-like fabric of our society's
racial coexistence.
A purely mathematical, ancestrally based, biological formula to define
who is African-American, such as that found in various state statutes,2 69
simply will not work in today's world. Any definition that would require
one to count his or her ancestors in order to determine "Blackness" is
practically impossible. The one-drop rule, or hypodescent, would also be
unworkable, as would the majoritarian system 270 some have proposed,
since both systems would have to begin with a presupposition that a par-
ticular ancestor was "Black." Where does one begin? Who was the first
African-American ancestor? To make an accurate determination, those
and a citizen of and domiciled within the United States, or that such person is not an
individual and is organized under or created by the laws of the United States or of any
[s]tate or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and has its princi-
pal place of business within the United States; and (3) a partnership, association, cor-
poration, organization, or other combination of persons organized under the laws of
or having its principal place of business in a foreign country.
22 U.S.C. § 611(b) (2006).
268. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, Afri-
can Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1265 (1997).
269. Id. at 1178 (citing Virginia's and North Carolina's eighteenth century attempts to
define what it meant to be "Black").
270. Id. at 1206-08 (disputing Luther Wright Jr.'s majoritarian classification system,
which suggests that a multiracial person belongs to the race of which he or she has the most
ancestry).
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whose ancestors were slaves would have to trace their genealogy all the
way back to the slave ships.
Is this what a true African-American is: a person descended from an
African brought to this country as a slave? Or, to overlay that query with
socio-political realities: is this the African-American the civil rights laws
and Voting Rights Act were enacted to protect? Then we ask: is Obama
an African-American? He certainly is not according to that definition.
President Obama's father was not brought to this country as a slave. His
father was an African national who married a White U.S. citizen. 271
Thus, Barack Obama certainly is an "African-American." Moreover, he
looks Black. But what of White South Africans of Dutch ancestry who
marry Americans of European descent? Are their American-born prog-
eny African-Americans? They will likely look White. Certainly the defi-
nition should not be expanded to include this child of a Dutch South
African and an American of European descent.
Or should the definition of an African-American be determined purely
morphologically through phenotypical traits? The obvious drawbacks of
such a system become readily apparent. Excluded from such a definition
would be anyone who did not have features characteristic of a person
descended from Africans. Consider this true scenario: one of the co-au-
thors, who is African-American, knew a pastor in his hometown, who,
along with his wife, looked distinguishably African-American, although
they were of moderate and very light complexion, respectively. They had
two sons: one looked distinguishably African-American and the other
looked distinctively White. Both were considered to be Black by both
the Black and White communities because of their familial identification.
When the White son grew up, he left the town and moved to another city
where no one knew him and he "passed" for White. He married a White
woman and lived in that community for a number of years as part of a
White family. Eventually, he and his White wife moved back to his
hometown and were considered a Black family, though everyone knew
his wife was White. By the morphological standard, the son who ap-
peared distinctively White would be excluded from any of the benefits
and protections of the subject laws.
Contrarily, consider the case of "White Boy Michael." White Boy
Michael (whose true name was not Michael) also lived in the hometown
of one of the co-authors. White Boy Michael was so-called because he
was a White boy. But what was unique about White Boy Michael is that
he was raised by a Black woman, though his natural mother and father
were both White. When Michael was very young his mother died, and he
271. Ta-Nehisi Paul Coates, Is Obama Black Enough?, TIME, Feb. 1, 2007, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1584736,00.html.
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was left with his White father. Soon after, his White father married a
Black woman. While Michael was very young, the White father died and
White Boy Michael's Black stepmother raised him as her own son.
What is even more significant about White Boy Michael is that if you
did not or could not see him, you would be convinced he was Black. The
timbre of his voice, the cadence, his mannerisms, everything about him
overwhelmingly bespoke "Black," but he clearly appeared White. The
co-author met Michael in a courtroom while legally representing Michael
on a minor misdemeanor matter. When he met Michael, he felt no preju-
dicial or judgmental "vibe," and there was a psychological feeling of con-
nectedness when he spoke with him that made him feel as though he was
relating to a Black person. He asked him: "Michael, there is something
about you and I can't figure out what it is - you seem so different." That
is when Michael related his story.
How would White Boy Michael fare under this system? Should he be
cast as the "putative" Black man? Many civil rights activists, at least on
first glance, would probably adamantly maintain that White Boy Michael
is not entitled to the legal benefits and protections afforded to African-
Americans. Any definition that had a purely morphological basis would
certainly leave him out. Nor would he fare well within a system based
upon hypodescent or any mathematically based methodology, since
White Boy Michael presumably cannot trace his ancestry to anyone of
African descent. Yet one is left with the feeling that White Boy Michael
may not be so different from that son of the Black pastor who appeared
distinctively White but was not. One can envision White Boy Michael
being so associated with the Black race as to be identified with it. Cer-
tainly, if the timbre of his voice was indistinguishably Black, he might
face discrimination based upon race in certain situations where he could
be heard but not seen, such as in a telephone conversation. Consider this:
"I'm sorry, Michael, but we just rented out the last apartment yesterday."
The prospective landlord may believe Michael to be Black and, thus,
deny him housing on that discriminatory basis. The perniciousness of ra-
cism often does not allow for "the benefit of the doubt."
When President Lyndon B. Johnson delivered the commencement ad-
dress at the historically Black institution of higher education, Howard
University in Washington, D.C., on June 4, 1965, just two months prior to
signing the Voting Rights Act into law, he spoke of the plight of the
"American Negro." '27 2 Johnson described the American Negro as de-
prived of freedoms, stating: "No act of my entire administration will give
272. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Commencement Address at Howard University:
To Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965) (transcript available at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650604.asp).
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me greater satisfaction than the day when my signature makes [the Vot-
ing Rights Act], too, the law of this land., 27 3 This "American Negro," the
one who exists by virtue of the experiences he or she suffers, the one
deprived of freedoms within this country because of racially discrimina-
tory perceptions, is the one to whom the protections of the law should
adhere.
We posit a definition:
An African-American within the meaning of state and federal laws
that address the benefits and protections designed for that class of
persons as a race category is a U.S. citizen, other than Native Ameri-
cans, Native Hawaiians, and Alaskan Indians, 274
(a) with phenotypical characteristics indicative of ancestry derived
from the dark-skinned peoples of the sub-Saharan African nations;
or
(b) who by virtue of his or her experience in this country as an
American is familially associated with persons possessing such char-
acteristics such that the person is indistinguishably identified as being
familially of that ancestry.
Thus, by this definition, there are two separate means by which a person
might "prove" that he or she is an African-American: first, phenotypi-
cally, by virtue of physical appearance, and second, through familial
association.
Applying this definition to the specific factual situations presented in
this Article will show how the legislative intent of the various statutes we
reference would best be met by our definition. It will also show how this
definition is better suited than that proposed by others to satisfy the
objectives of the legislation uniquely designed to provide protections to
this class of persons.
We begin with President Obama. Is Obama Black? According to the
subject definition, he would likely be able to easily satisfy both of the
criteria advanced: a) phenotypically, since he does possess certain classic
features that are typically identified with African-Americans, and b)
familially, since his father was an actual native of a sub-Saharan African
nation. His father was "a Kenyan of the Luo tribe, born on the shores of
Lake Victoria in a place called Alego. ' 275
273. Id.
274. Native Americans, Native Hawaiians, and Alaskan Indians are explicitly ex-
empted from this definition because of the uniqueness of these minority groupings and the
fact that there are government regulations designed to specifically cover these groups of
people. Certainly, this is not a perfect methodology, since there are peoples within these
groups who, due to mixed parentage, may more fully identify as African-Americans.
275. BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM My FATHER 9 (2004).
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D. Comparison to Other Methods of Racial Classification
Professor Neil Gotanda points to anthropologist Marvin Harris as the
originator of the term for the "American system of social reproduction:
'hypodescent,"' or the "one drop rule." 76 According to Gotanda, this
system of racial classification produces two formal rules in answer to the
question-"Who is Black?":
1) Rule of recognition: Any person whose Black-African ancestry is
visible is Black.
2) Rule of descent: (a) Any person with a known trace of African
ancestry is Black, notwithstanding that person's visual appearance;
or, stated differently, (b) the offspring of a Black and a [W]hite is
Black.277
In comparing hypodescent to our proposed definition, there are obvi-
ous similarities. Both definitions are designed to be inclusive. That is,
both our proposed rule and the rule of hypodescent are designed to make
it more likely than not that a person with any "Blackness" would meet
the definitional requirements. Where the rule of hypodescent and our
proposed rule would differ is in Part 2 of the hypodescent system and
Part b of our proposed definition. Part 2 of the hypodescent system es-
sentially would require a person to prove African ancestry-a biological
requirement. Part b of our definition is, to a degree, "ecologically 278
based in that proof that one is African-American can be ascertained
through community perception of familial association based upon the
physical, cultural, and social environments that affected that person.
In proposing alternatives to the hypodescent system, Professor Go-
tanda posits what he deems a more logical and symmetrical scheme for
the purpose of categorizing persons of mixed descent. 279 This scheme is
based upon historically documented methods of racial categorization,
which he cites as having been used throughout the United States:
1. Mulatto: All mixed offspring are called [M]ulattoes, irrespective of
the percentages or fractions of their Black or [W]hite ancestry.
276. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 24 (1991) (footnote omitted).
277. Id.
278. Human ecology deals with the interrelationship between humans and their envi-
ronments. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Human Ecology, http://merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/human+ecology (last visited Oct. 5, 2009). Specifically, human ecology
focuses on the economic, social, and political environments in which humans engage every
day. Id. Thus, the definition of "African-American" must consider how humans engage in
their environments, in addition to biological factors.
279. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV.
1, 25 (1991).
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2. Named Fractions: Individuals are assigned labels according to the
fractional composition of their racial ancestry. Thus, a [M]ulatto is
one-half [W]hite and one-half Black. A quadroon is one-fourth
Black and three-fourths [W]hite, a sambo one-fourth [Wihite and
three-fourths Black, etc.
3. Majoritarian: The higher percentage of either [W]hite or Black an-
cestry determines the [Wihite or Black label.
4. Social Continuum: This is a variation on the Named Fractions
scheme: Labels generally correspond to the proportion of [Wihite or
Black ancestry, but social status is also an important factor in deter-
mining which label applies. The result is a much less rigid system of
racial classification.28 °
What each of these methodologies requires is a categorization of persons
of mixed descent that would cause such persons to be defined as some-
thing other than African-American.2 18  But such delineation ignores the
socio-historical realities of race. Thus, persons who would be considered
multiracial by any of these named methods would therefore not be con-
sidered African-American, making such persons ineligible for the protec-
tions or benefits any federal and state laws may provide for persons who
are considered legally African-American.282
According to Professor Hickman, Luther Wright derives his definition
of African-American using elements of both the "Mulatto" and
"majoritarian" systems.28 3 The following is that portion of Wright's pro-
posed racial classification system that includes a definition of African-
American and a separate classification for biracial Americans:
African[-]Americans-All natural born citizens having the majority
of their origins in the original peoples of sub-Saharan Africa.
280. Id. (footnotes omitted).
281. Id.
282. This is not to argue against the present system in effect since 2000, which allows
census respondents to self-identify as multi-racial.
283. See Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories,
African Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1161, 1206 (1997) (analyzing
Luther Wright's majoritarian classification system). "Wright briefly proposes a scheme
that would use elements of both the [Miulatto and majoritarian systems in order to realign
racial definitions in this country." Id. Under Wright's system, individuals would trace
their ancestry to determine their race. Id. This classification system takes biology more
into account than sociopolitical considerations. Id. at 1207.
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Biracial Americans-All natural born citizens who have origins in
two or more racial groups or have the majority of their origins in the
original peoples of Northern Africa and the Middle East.2 4
This definition of African-American is essentially a majoritarian system
requiring a person to have a majority of ancestors from the sub-Saharan
region in order to be included within this definition.285 It would also re-
quire that a person prove his or her ancestry, which is certainly difficult
given the paucity of genealogical records that would be needed to make
such proof.286 In addition, Wright's definition would categorize persons
as "biracial" if their origins are in two or more racial groups; thus, such
persons would not be considered African-American even though they
may appear to be African-American and, therefore, in need of the pro-
tections of various federal and state antidiscrimination laws.287
To illustrate how the features of these various definitional systems
compare with our proposed definition (the subject definition), the follow-
ing chart shows how certain individuals referenced in this Article might
be categorized:2 88
284. Luther Wright, Jr., Who's Black, Who's White, and Who Cares: Reconceptualiz-
ing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48 VAND. L. REV. 513,
563 (1995) (emphasis in original) (proposing a new system of racial classification).
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 563.
288. This chart is not necessarily inclusive of every possible racial phenomenon. In
addition, neither the "Named Fractions" nor the "Social Continuum" systems are depicted
in this chart.
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CHART A
System Obama278  White Boy Pastor's son Pastor's sonMichael 279  #1280 #2281
Hypodescent
Mulatto
Majoritarian
Wright's
Scheme
Subject
Definition
Legend: Dark = Black Light = White Medium = Biracial
* Assuming the likelihood of Black ancestors on the Black parent's side.
+ Categorization depends on affidavits from people in the community as to whether the person is
regarded as Black or White.
E. Impact of Such a Proposal upon Existing Laws
How can our proposed definition be practically enforced? Certainly,
as with most laws, enforcement would be complex-particularly so con-
cerning a subject matter as sensitive and volatile as race. Regulations
with respect to each of the individual groups to which the definition
might apply would be needed to facilitate proving that a person meets the
defining qualifications. To prove the second part of our definition, a per-
son may be required to provide affidavits from one or more persons
within his or her community, particularly where he or she may have
grown up, attended school, and/or worked. These affidavits may satisfy
the proof of familial association. Tracing one's genealogy, though far
more difficult and expensive, might be done by a certified or accredited
genealogist. This approach would require the subject to trace his or her
genealogical roots to sub-Saharan Africa.
Determining a person's physical characteristics, of course, is far more
problematic. Who should be the judge of that? This determination
would necessitate a system whereby someone who is considered an ex-
pert in, perhaps, anthropology would discern a person's physical charac-
teristics to determine whether that person possessed sub-Saharan African
features. Professor Hickman cites two cases that illustrate the difficulty
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in using experts and visual inspections.289 Much of the confusion in these
cases appears to result from the fact that the persons who were allowed to
testify as "experts" may not have been experts at all. 29' And then the so-
called experts themselves could not agree on which evidence should be
considered "scientific" evidence of the existence of "Black blood. '291 Yet
if a person clearly possesses recognized African-American features, there
ought to be a basis for proof (as contemnible as it may be to judge race
based upon a person's features) that would not require production of affi-
davits or other external evidence. But if a person clearly appeared to be
African-American, there would likely be no challenge to the person's
race, and, thus, phenotyping would be rarely utilized. In this, there is
some redemption for phenotyping's use.
During the slavery period and those periods in the history of this coun-
try when the "Black codes" and Jim Crow laws were enforced, plaintiffs
in racial definition cases sought to establish that they were not Black in
order to avoid the legal penalties for being a part of that race. But in a
modern-day case, the plaintiff would normally be seeking to establish
himself as fitting within the definition of an "African-American" (as op-
posed to being excluded from the definition) in order to gain a benefit
conditioned upon such classification. Our definition of African-Ameri-
can serves to both facilitate and regulate this process.
V. CONCLUSION
As we are not in a perfect world, it would be impossible to craft a rule
that would operate uniformly and without flaws. Indeed, any such defini-
tion based upon race may be exposed to a constitutional confrontation.
Arguing that racial categories be eliminated entirely or that there be
multi-racial distinctions, while attractive, ignores the harsh persistence of
racial divisions and discriminatory treatment that prevail in our society
today. Such proposals promote an idealism that clashes with reality.
The inclusiveness of our conceptual formulation recognizes that the
concept of race was spawned out of a social/historical context pulling
within its grasp a people who, for better or worse, are powerless to es-
cape. These are the people whom the various civil rights laws were de-
signed to protect. These are the people for whom the protections of such
laws should lie.
So long as there are federal, state, and local laws that pertain to race,
there must be a workable definition for distinguishing a racial categoriza-
289. Christine B. Hickman, The Devil and the One Drop Rule: Racial Categories, Afri-
can Americans, and the U.S. Census, 95 MICH. L. REV 1161, 1228-29 (1997).
290. Id.
291. Id.
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tion to which an individual would be assigned. Any such definition could
be uniformly applied on a federal, state, and local level. Our proposed
definition absorbs the historical socio-political context that spawned its
existence; thus, rather than discard this historical parentage, it acknowl-
edges and reflects this reality. Race is an issue in this country that, thus
far, refuses to be defused.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A to Opinion of Justice Brennan from the case of: Thorn-
burg v. Gringles, 478 U.S. 30
CHART B
Percentages of Votes Cast by Black and
White Voters for
Black Candidates in the Five Contested Districts
Senate District 22
Primary General
White Black White Black
1978 (Alexander) 47 87 41 94
1980 (Alexander) 23 78 n/a n/a
1982 (Polk) 32 83 33 94
House District 21
Primary General
White Black White Black
1978 (Blue) 21 76 n/a n/a
1980 (Blue) 31 81 44 90
1982 (Blue) 39 82 45 1 91
House District 23
Primary General
White Black White Black
1978 Senate
Barns n/a n/a 17 5
(Repub.) n
1978 House
Clement 10 89 n/a n/a
Spaulding 16 92 37 89
1980 House
Spaulding n/a n/a 49 90
1982 House
Clement 26 32 n/a n/a
rSpaulding 37 90 43 89
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House District 36
Primary General
White Black White Black
1980 (Maxwell) 22 71 28 92
1982 (Berry) 50 79 42 92
House District 39
Primary General
White Black White Black
1978 House
Kennedy, H. 28 76 32 93
Norman 8 29 n/a n/a
Ross 17 53 n/a n/a
Sumter (Repub.) n/a n/a 33 25
1980 House
Kennedy, A. 40 86 32 96
Norman 18 36 n/a n/a
1980 Senate
Small 12 61 n/a n/a
1982 House
Hauser 25 80 42 87
Kennedy, A. 36 87
Appendix B to Opinion of Justice Brennan from the case of: Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
CHART C
Black Candidates Elected From Seven Originally Contested Districts
District Prior to
(No. Seats) 1972 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982
House 8 (4) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
House 21 (6) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
House 23 (3) 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
House 36 (8) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
House 39 (5) 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
Senate 2 (2) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Senate 22 (4) 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
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